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1 Introduction 
In September 2020, the Department of Health and Social Care commissioned 
The King’s Fund to conduct a rapid evidence synthesis of the likely strengths and 
weaknesses of different models of commissioning and accountability for drug 
treatment services in England, to inform Dame Carol Black’s Independent 
Review of Drugs.  
Within the rapid evidence synthesis, we were asked to explore five research 
questions. 
• What are the strengths and limitations of different approaches to 
commissioning drug treatment services in England? 
• What are the strengths and limitations of different approaches to 
accountability for drug treatment commissioning? 
• What can be learnt from other services with comparable commissioning 
and accountability arrangements – such as sexual health services in 
England – about the overall design of commissioning and accountability 
arrangements for drug services? 
• What does current practice tell us about the wider conditions needed at a 
system level to ensure the effectiveness of commissioning and 
accountability mechanisms generally and what does this imply for drugs? 
• How would different approaches to commissioning and accountability align 
with the broader policy direction of integrated care systems (ICSs) in 
England and what are the broad implications of this for drugs? 
The scope of this report is to consider drug treatment services. In practice, it is 
often hard to disentangle the commissioning of drug treatment services from the 
commissioning of alcohol treatment services – for example where both are 
funded from a single budget – and readers may need to consider our analysis in 
that context. 
This report was completed before the publication of the Integration and 
Innovation White Paper and plans for the future of the public health system in 
March 2021, therefore our analysis does not consider the detail of these 
proposals and their implication for drug treatment services. 
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Our approach  
Owing to limitations on time to complete this work, we worked with the 
Department of Health and Social Care and Public Health England review team to 
narrow down the scope. For example, we addressed the research questions in 
the context of drug services in England and primarily focused on adult services. 
We also identified five topics that the review team were particularly interested 
in. These were: funding models, joint commissioning, contracting models, 
commissioner capacity and capability, and accountability. 
We conducted several targeted literature searches relevant to our lines of 
enquiry using bibliographic databases (The King’s Fund’s database, Medline and 
PsycINFO) and the internet. We also checked relevant organisational websites 
and the references of key documents for further relevant material. In addition, 
we examined evidence submitted to the Department of Health and Social Care 
as part of the second call for evidence for the Independent Review, and drew on 
insights from experts at The King’s Fund, plus a small number of interviews with 
commissioners and representatives from national bodies. As a research team, 
we identified key case studies and models, and developed insights through 
discussion.  
Structure of this report 
Section 2 of this report provides an overview of our assessment of the evidence 
about the components of an effective system, the implications of the 
development of ICSs for drug services and areas we think would benefit from 
further study. This section can be used as a ‘standalone’ document by the review 
team for ease of reference.  
Section 3 outlines our detailed findings about the components of an effective 
system. It is divided into several subsections, based on the priorities we 
identified with the review team:  
• funding 
• joint commissioning  
• new contracting approaches 
• commissioner capacity and capability 
• accountability.  
In this section we sought to draw out the strengths and weaknesses of different 
models, but in practice that was easier to achieve for some areas than for 
others. Discrete issues such as funding, or what contract model to use, have 
identified ‘models’ with their own advantages and disadvantages. Other areas 
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such as joint working and accountability are highly interconnected and have so 
many components that there are not discrete ‘models’ to compare. Therefore, 
these themes are explored in a more discursive way.  
Section 4 presents case studies that provide insights on different aspects of the 
components of an effective system. These cover: 
• child and adolescent mental health services (CAMHS)  
• the Troubled Families programme  
• sexual health services 
• the National Treatment Agency  
• other UK nations. 
In section 5, we discuss the development of ICSs across the NHS and local 
government, and draw out the relevant learning for drug treatment services.   
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2 Overview 
The Department of Health and Social Care commissioned The King’s Fund to 
conduct a rapid evidence synthesis of the likely strengths and weaknesses of 
different models of commissioning and accountability for drug treatment services 
in England. This work was conducted to inform Dame Carol Black’s Independent 
Review of Drugs for the Secretary of State.  
Because of the short timeframe for this research, we worked with the review 
team to identify priorities for investigation within this scope. These were: 
approaches to funding, joint commissioning, contracting, commissioner capacity 
and capability, and accountability. 
This overview provides a high-level summary of our findings on these topics and 
looks across them to discuss key issues that emerge when the system is 
considered as a whole. It also sets out key issues relating to the development of 
integrated care systems (ICSs) across the NHS and local government that are 
pertinent to drug treatment services. Finally, it identifies areas that the research 
team believe would be amenable to further study to inform the ongoing 
development of policy in this area. More details on each of these topics, as well 
as case studies that provide useful lessons for drug services, are contained in 
the sections that follow. 
Our work is drawn from multiple sources, it is evidence informed but also 
includes the insight we have from understanding the wider development of 
health policy and health systems.  
Drugs policy is highly complex. It spans public health through to treatment 
services; responsibility sits across different commissioning organisations; and 
oversight spans multiple government departments. Designing a commissioning 
and accountability system for such a complex area can never be based on 
evidence alone – each ‘system’ has a different context, and evidence of ‘what 
works’ is always partial and context specific. Our findings should therefore be 
interpreted in this light. 
There are four key findings and a strategic question that arise from our work in 
the round. In implementing Dame Carol Black’s final report, these are the areas 
that we believe are most important to address. 
• How the system fits together is more important than any single 
issue itself. Funding, commissioning and accountability interact – they 
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are not separable in terms of ‘let’s fix this first’. For example, the drugs 
system requires stronger and clearer accountability, but if this is not 
accompanied by improvement support (including funding), areas cannot 
improve, and accountability risks becoming penalty only. 
• The desired characteristics of individual components of the system 
can be in opposition to each other, and trade-offs must be 
considered and addressed to ensure the overall model is effective. 
For example, bottom-up approaches rather than top-down direction may 
be the most facilitative of effective collaboration between partner 
organisations at place level, but without expectations and scrutiny from 
above they would also have the loosest accountability. 
• There is not enough money in the system, whatever the future 
funding mechanism (eg the existence and nature of a ring-fence). The 
overall amount of funding available will have an impact on design 
decisions. Significant additional funding is needed given the range of 
improvements required across service provision and the underpinning 
system, including commissioning, accountability, user involvement and 
service improvement. Without a step-change in funding, development will 
be more marginal and decisions such as ring-fencing within the public 
health grant could have unintended wider impacts, such as denuding 
other valid public health goals.  
• The commissioning of drug treatment services has been through a unique 
process of change in recent years, which is separate from policy changes 
that have been taking place to integrate the wider health and care sector. 
However, upcoming wider policy changes will have a significant 
impact on the environment in which drug services are 
commissioned. The design, governance and scope of ICSs will change 
significantly in 2021–22. Some of the changes may help support changes 
in drug services – for example: intentions for joint budgets across the 
NHS and local government, clearer accountability structures including at 
the regional level, further deepening of the commitment to work in 
partnership and a focus on population health, not just the process of 
treatment. 
• There is a strategic framing issue for drug services. One view could 
be ‘exceptionalism’ – ie drug treatment requires a bespoke and unique 
end-to-end service and its own specialist workforce. At the other extreme, 
given that drug users’ needs often go far beyond just treatment for 
addiction, drug treatment could be seen as an exemplar of what a 
broader, more integrated health system is now seeking to achieve. Ways 
need to be found to hold both ways of thinking and define an approach 
that strikes the right balance between them. 
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Below is a summary of the findings on the individual components of an effective 
system that we examined in our research. We sought to draw out the strengths 
and weaknesses of different models but in practice that was easier to achieve for 
some areas than for others. Discrete issues such as funding, or what contract 
model to use, have identified ‘models’ with their own advantages and 
disadvantages. Other areas like joint working and accountability are highly 
interconnected and have so many components that there are not discrete 
‘models’ to compare. Therefore, these themes are explored in a more discursive 
way.  
Funding 
• There are various possible funding mechanisms that could be applied to 
drug treatment services, but they will only be effective if an adequate 
overall level of funding is available. 
• Although some people talked to us about ‘simply’ giving funding and 
commissioning back to the NHS, this is not a straightforward option in 
practice: it would require significant reorganisation, with the creation of 
new structures. 
• A specific drug treatment budget, which is co-ordinated with partners’ 
budgets towards a joint place-based strategy, is used in other countries 
and merits further exploration. There are, however, risks associated with 
it, which include disruption and unintended effects on local authorities’ 
ability to manage the remainder of the public health grant effectively. 
There is also a need to avoid over-engineered processes. 
• Ring-fencing could be put in place to protect drug treatment budgets, but 
it can be difficult to define ring-fences without loopholes and it may be 
difficult to avoid unhelpfully narrowing down the definition of treatment 
(without important but broad public health interventions). In addition, the 
government has previously committed to removing ring-fences in the 
public health grant (although this remains uncertain given the challenges 
of the Covid-19 pandemic and the knock-on impacts on local business 
rates as a source of local government finance). This means ring-fencing 
may not be a long-term option. Strengthening accountability and 
transparency may be alternatives to creating additional financial processes 
and structures. 
• There is a case for considering funding specialist (‘high-cost/low-volume’) 
services differently from others, for example by commissioning on a 
regional basis by groups of local authorities in response to need across a 
sufficiently large population. Even if funded differently, local 
commissioners would need to retain a central role in ensuring a join-up 
with locally commissioned services. 
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Joint commissioning 
• In 2013, joint commissioning arrangements for drug services (cross-
sector drug actions teams) were disbanded. The sector is looking for new 
ways to get commissioners from the NHS, local government, the police 
and probation services to work together effectively. Evidence linking 
commissioning approaches to improvements in quality and outcomes is 
very limited, and therefore no single model emerges from the literature as 
the best approach. 
• There is agreement that different services should be commissioned over 
different population footprints, depending on their characteristics. 
Therefore for specialised inpatient drug treatment and rehabilitation 
services, which are low in volume, it might be appropriate to commission 
across multiple local authorities or an ICS. Most drug treatment services 
need to be commissioned at the local authority level because this is the 
geography at which effective joint working between public health teams, 
other parts of local authorities, the NHS, prisons and probation services is 
most easily facilitated. 
• Following the abolition of drug action teams, health and wellbeing boards 
were envisaged as the body that would develop integrated strategies for 
local areas. However, they cover all of health and wellbeing, and were not 
designed to have the commissioning or operational responsibilities that 
would be necessary to play a significant role in planning and delivering 
drug services across sectors. Other measures are therefore needed to 
ensure the effective joint commissioning of drug services across sectors. 
• There is consensus across other UK nations (and formerly England) that 
some form of formal partnership is needed to support effective drug 
treatment commissioning, including a local plan, aligned or pooled 
budgets, and collective accountability.  
• Differences in the geographies, relationships and resources in different 
parts of the country mean locally developed approaches to joint 
commissioning that build on existing system strengths are likely to be the 
most effective. The first step to effective joint working is agreeing what 
local partners want to achieve through consultation between 
commissioners, providers, patients/service users and communities. A plan 
can then be created that includes the right combination of governance and 
funding mechanisms to support achievement of that vision. However, an 
entirely bottom-up approach will not provide the accountability needed to 
reduce variation and provide the necessary assurance on spend. 
• Strong leadership and investment in building relationships across sectors 
are key success factors for joint commissioning (and system development 
more broadly). This takes time and requires stability in the system, which 
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points to the need to invest in leadership development and commissioner 
capacity (see below) and not undertake major restructuring exercises 
unless the case for change is undeniable.  
New contracting approaches 
• New contracting approaches – such as ‘prime’ and ‘alliance’ models – have 
been developed to promote better joint working between commissioners 
and a range of providers across the NHS and local authorities. However, 
they will not – by themselves – overcome differences in organisational 
interests and relationship problems. 
• ‘Prime’ contract models, which devolve responsibility for commissioning to 
a provider or group of providers who then subcontract with others, require 
the prime provider to have the capacity and skills to undertake 
commissioning tasks. In some local areas these skills may not be present 
and the model will not be viable.  
• Developing and implementing these new contracting models is usually a 
long and costly process and meaningful outcome measures can be difficult 
to define, particularly for complex populations like drug users. These 
models can also be particularly difficult for small organisations to engage 
with, and this can be a barrier to the involvement of some third sector 
organisations. Commissioners must ensure that whatever contracting 
approach they choose, valuable input from small charities is not lost. 
• Rather than focusing on developing contracts to promote integration, 
some commissioners are starting to take a more collaborative and 
facilitative approach – working with providers to jointly agree a local 
vision and develop services rather than focusing on arm’s-length contract 
negotiations. Collaborative approaches are in their early stages, but there 
are examples of NHS and local authority commissioners and providers 
starting to work together in this way to make best use of scarce system 
resources and minimise unnecessary transaction costs. More broadly, NHS 
policy development is moving away from transactional approaches to 
commissioning towards more collaborative models, and legislation has 
been proposed to remove some of the competition requirements that 
currently affect the sector. 
• If contract models are going to be used to promote integration, the first 
step should always be a dialogue between commissioners, providers, 
patients and the wider community to develop a vision for the service 
area/group. Commissioners can then work backwards from that vision to 
build a contracting model that delivers its aspirations. 
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Commissioner capacity and capability 
• The capacity and capability that commissioners need to be effective is 
determined by the models of care and outcomes a system wants to 
achieve through commissioning. The number of commissioners needed 
and how specialised their skills should be cannot be assessed in isolation 
but require some form of local strategy to be in place. 
• More evidence is needed, but that available so far suggests that there 
needs to be national policy leadership for the approach to drug treatment, 
with a workforce strategy to support it. There are choices about how much 
detail to set out from the centre, but the evidence we have seen suggests 
that, in any option, a degree of national infrastructure will need to be built 
up over time to assess and promote effective approaches and to support 
workforce development. 
• Whatever approach is taken, it is essential to assure basic capacity for 
effective commissioning, such as access to knowledge about substance 
use and treatment services, sufficient time to develop relationships with 
providers and both time and skills (eg data analysis) to carry out thorough 
needs assessment. 
• This report focuses on the capacity and capability of commissioners, but 
we noted that there are also concerns about the capacity and capability of 
the wider drug treatment workforce. 
• Although NHS commissioning support units do not offer a model because 
of the variable ways in which they have been implemented, the basic 
concept of a national framework of ambitions/expectations for 
commissioning together with regional centres of support and expert 
advice for commissioners warrants consideration. Public Health England’s 
regional centres appear to have something potentially approaching that 
regional role in some cases. 
Accountability 
• Since the 2013 reforms, there are now just two main levers for local 
authorities’ accountability – sector-led improvement and formal 
intervention by the Secretary of State – with a large gap between them. 
There is a lack of confidence that sector-led improvement is robust in 
ensuring accountability, but our research suggests it is under-used, and 
perhaps not used at all in drug services, related to a lack of central 
funding for it; doing so could be an opportunity for testing and evaluating 
the approach. 
• For public health functions, lines of accountability have become diffuse 
and complex. National datasets of public health and drug treatment 
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outcomes and performance indicators are available, but they are not 
currently used for accountability. 
• More evidence is needed, but comparing drug treatment services to a five-
point framework for types of accountability in health and care suggests 
that: 
o the consistency of focus and follow-through by scrutiny committees 
could be improved 
o it is difficult to achieve accountability through performance-based 
contracts, with a risk of over-engineering, selection bias and limited 
impact 
o management accountability is currently entirely within individual local 
authorities, and is potentially just one item on a broad performance 
dashboard – some external oversight and a specific focus on drug 
services may be needed 
o regulatory accountability is only possible for registered providers and 
not for commissioners or the system as a whole – however, although 
they do not have enforcement sanctions, whole-system thematic 
reviews by the regulator could be useful in shining a light on issues 
o drug treatment services may be perceived as lacking political impact, 
but our research on rough sleeping and associated health issues 
suggests that building local political commitment could create positive 
electoral accountability as a positive force for improvement.  
• There is a case for considering a regional role for accountability in 
services, such as drug treatment services, which have complex local 
accountability and poor connection to national accountability. 
• There are caveats about transferring learning from the NHS to local 
authorities. However, there are examples that may offer useful principles 
for consideration – such as the arrangements for ensuring that funding for 
additional increased access to child and adolescent mental health services 
(CAMHS) is conditional on an approval process for local plans and routine 
external monitoring of performance and outcomes. 
• Radical changes in 2013 in England contrast with the other UK countries’ 
evolutionary approaches to drug treatment services. There is significant 
potential to learn from Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland as they 
progressively embed and mature approaches to accountability for 
outcomes, performance and quality. 
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The implications of the development of integrated care 
systems 
• The NHS is moving away from using competition as a tool for 
improvement and is firmly focused on collaboration as the best route to 
fulfilling the health and care needs of local populations. ICSs are 
partnerships that bring together providers and commissioners of the NHS, 
local authorities and other local partners in a geographical area, to 
collectively plan and integrate care to meet the needs of their population. 
• Given the focus of ICSs is integrating care across complex system 
boundaries, for patients with complex needs, it is important that drug 
treatment services align with commissioning and accountability in ICSs 
and vice versa. 
• ICSs have been developing at different rates in different parts of England, 
and are expected to cover all of England by April 2021 (there will be 
around 44). Significant change is planned in 2021 and 2022 and is 
outlined in plans published at the end of November 2020. This includes 
stronger, but locally flexible, governance and accountability – bringing in 
wider partners including local government and the voluntary sector. It 
also includes proposals to formalise ICSs in legislation by April 2022. 
• The emerging partnership structures being created through ICSs might be 
an effective place to consider situating any new accountability 
mechanisms being developed. However, there is a big question about 
scale and the appropriate footprint of a regional accountability role for 
drug services (as well as the formal powers) and whether that matches 
ICSs, or other footprints. This is an open question, but ICSs are sub-
regional structures in the NHS that are being formed and this is a factor to 
be taken into account in any regional new structure that supports 
commissioning and accountability around drug services. 
• As part of the plans for the future of ICSs, all NHS providers will join 
provider collaboratives. Well-designed provider collaboratives are the 
mirror of joint commissioning and partnership approaches to planning. 
Given the complex needs of most people with drugs issues, these 
collaboratives are likely to have an implication for the services people with 
drugs problems receive. Drugs commissioners therefore need to 
understand and engage with these collaboratives as they are formed. 
• The government has announced a new National Institute for Health 
Protection as a response to the Covid-19 pandemic, which has 
implications for the rest of Public Health England, and potentially the 
public health system it oversees. There is an opportunity to rethink the 
public health system in England, including commissioning and 
accountability, and the role of national and regional tiers and the 
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connection to ICSs. Those responding to Dame Carol Black’s review will 
need to engage and influence public health reform, alongside the 
development of ICSs. 
Further work 
We believe that the review team could usefully explore some key areas following 
Dame Carol Black’s report, to inform the shape of the response to it in future 
policy development. From our work, the areas below would be priorities, in our 
view. 
First, the role of a regional tier. The case for a regional tier is discussed across 
our topic areas as a way to strengthen vertical accountability, to support 
improvement, to make the most of scarce expertise, and potentially as the level 
for commissioning specialised services, as ICSs will operate at the regional or 
sub-regional level in the future. It would need to be designed carefully, with a 
role in reducing unwarranted variation, while also supporting innovation and 
ideally engaging with ICSs and any regional structure in the future public health 
system. 
Second, further investigation into what an external directed improvement 
support offer could look like. This could range from supporting current models 
such as peer-to-peer sector-led improvement in local government and 
commissioning support units in the NHS, to models such as the former national 
support teams, which were connected to reaching public service agreement 
targets, to more directed models. There is clearly a need for such an approach in 
drug services and commissioning; and without an effective and systematic 
means of improvement, other changes will founder. Whether this should be 
national, regional or local should also be looked at. 
Third, a more in-depth investigation into the strengths and weaknesses of, and 
transferability of learning from, the drug commissioning and provision systems 
in the devolved nations. There is clearly experience of direct relevance to 
England, but the systems are different. In some ways they have characteristics 
of where the wider health policy context within which drugs commissioning sits 
is heading in England – ie more integrated systems. 
And finally, more consideration of the implications of the development of ICSs in 
2021–22, as they progress further, into population health systems. Many of the 
developments that are planned for ICSs over the next two years could be very 
helpful. Clearly, there is a strategic decision to be taken about the extent to 
which drugs policy and implementation wish to join or align with this direction of 
travel, or go on their own path.  
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• There are various possible funding mechanisms that could be applied 
to drug treatment services, but they will only be effective if an 
adequate overall level of funding is available. 
• Although some people talked to us about ‘simply’ giving funding and 
commissioning back to the NHS, this is not a straightforward option 
in practice: it would require significant reorganisation, with the 
creation of new structures. 
• A specific drug treatment budget, which is co-ordinated with 
partners’ budgets towards a joint place-based strategy, is used in 
other countries and merits further exploration. There are, however, 
risks associated with it, which include disruption and unintended 
effects on local authorities’ ability to manage the remainder of the 
public health grant effectively. There is also a need to avoid over-
engineered processes. 
• Ring-fencing could be put in place to protect drug treatment 
budgets, but it can be difficult to define ring-fences without loopholes 
and it may be difficult to avoid unhelpfully narrowing down the 
definition of treatment (without important but broad public health 
interventions). In addition, the government has previously 
committed to removing ring-fences in the public health grant 
(although this remains uncertain given the challenges of the Covid-
19 pandemic and knock-on impacts on local business rates as a 
source of local government finance). This means ring-fencing may 
not be a long-term option. Strengthening accountability and 
transparency may be alternatives to creating additional financial 
processes and structures. 
• There is a case for considering funding specialist (‘high-cost/low-
volume’) services differently from others, for example by 
commissioning on a regional basis by groups of local authorities in 
response to need across a sufficiently large population. Even if 
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funded differently, local commissioners would need to retain a 
central role in ensuring a join-up with locally commissioned services. 
 
The issue  
Drug treatment services are now funded via the public health grant. The public 
health grant per head of population has reduced by almost a quarter between 
2014/15 and 2019/20 (Buck 2019). Prior to 2013, drug treatment services had 
their own protected funding source, which was overseen by the National 
Treatment Agency for Substance Misuse (NTA) and grew significantly year on 
year during the NTA’s existence. 
The public health grant as a whole is ring-fenced and certain ‘prescribed 
services’ set out in regulations are legally required to be provided, but they are 
not individually ring-fenced. Drug and alcohol treatment is the second largest 
component of the public health grant. The government has committed itself to 
removing all ring-fencing in future reforms of the public health grant and 
business rates retention; however, implementing that commitment has been 
delayed several times and there is no clear timetable at present. 
Budgets for drug services are often combined with budgets for alcohol services 
even though the two are different and can compete for priority on different 
public health criteria (ie large numbers of people requiring alcohol services 
versus smaller numbers of drugs users but with more acute health risks). 
Furthermore, combined budgets are in contrast to historical arrangements that 
had allocated separate funding for opioid users (who have different needs, 
associated social and criminal issues, and treatment outcomes compared with 
non-opioid users). 
Funding pressures and cuts are a key part of the concerns about drug treatment 
services, including concerns that current accountability arrangements are not 
strong enough to ensure that any additional funding is spent on drugs rather 
than on other competing public health priorities.  
Concepts/models  
In Table 1 we outline the different potential funding options (or models) for drug 
treatment services as well as their strengths and weaknesses.  
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Table 1 Potential funding models and their strengths and weaknesses 
 Model Description Pros Cons 






councils are held to 
account for use of 
the public health 
grant and for 




• Least disruptive 
option 










initiative is a 
possible 
example of how 
it could be 
possible to 
strike a balance 
(see section 4) 
Separate discrete 
funding 
As in the past, have 




of the current 
general public 
health grant 
funding plus various 
national ‘pots’ 
• Widely used 
elsewhere 
• Can recognise 
the complexity 
of the sector 
and ensure a 
sustained focus 
• Can be designed 







• Protects budgets 




• Moderate to 
high disruption  
• If not the route 
of a special 
health authority 
(as the NTA 
was), it could 
require 
legislation 









‘giving up’ their 
aspects of drug-
related budgets) 
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grant ring-
fencing in future 
• An 
‘exceptionalist’ 
approach can be 





• Could remove 
flexibility in the 
public health 






Bespoke ring-fence Keep the current 
system as it is but 
create a ring-fence 
for drug treatment 
funding (all of it or 
a portion of it) 
• Low disruption 
• Protects budgets 
• May not be 
politically 
acceptable; runs 








• May not be 







• Could remove 
flexibility in the 
public health 
grant and create 
new pressures 
on other 
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• Difficult to 
define to 




different types of 
services 
The main example 
is to fund clinical 
services through 
the NHS and non-
clinical services 
through councils 








• Risk of creating 
a fragmented 









NHS to be a 


















– but could also 
help integrate 
into wider ICS 
approaches 
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• Only solves 
limited issues on 
its own and may 







All funding through 
the NHS 
Often described as 
giving the funding 
role back to the 
NHS (as the NTA 
was a special health 
authority), all 
funding would be 
via the NHS budget 
• No benefits 
when framed as 
‘giving back to 
the NHS’ (see 





then pros and 
cons could apply 
as in model 2 
(see above) 




before and the 
NTA was a 
special type of 
NHS body used 
as a vehicle for 
working across 
the NHS and 
councils – 
without the 




anymore in the 
NHS 
• Concerns from 
our interviews 
that the NHS is 
not well placed 
to commission 
non-clinical 
services or to 
promote ‘join-
up’ with the full 
range of partner 
services 
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Evidence  
The Independent Review of Drugs has described a recent history of real-terms 
reductions to the public health grant and, within that, reductions in expenditure 
on the drugs budget (Black 2020). Submissions to the call for evidence appear 
unanimous in claiming a need for additional funding. 
Drug treatment services when added to alcohol treatment services (as they are 
not separate budget ‘pots’) are the second largest area of expenditure in the 
public health grant, behind services for children aged 0–5, and with expenditure 
on sexual health services in third place, ‘miscellaneous’ in fourth and all other 
categories much smaller (The Health Foundation 2020). Making changes to the 
drugs budget that protect it could increase risks to the other budget lines for 
other services funded through the public health grant.  
Previous arrangements in England channelled the whole drug treatment budget 
through the NTA, separate from other NHS or council budget lines. And there 
was ring-fenced funding for opioid treatment services, linked to crime-reduction 
strategies. During this time the NTA’s budget increased from £50 million to £467 
million (source: review team evidence). 
In addition to the formal drug treatment budget, interviewees told us that some 
councils and some NHS bodies funded certain services from their ‘general’ 
budgets, although this was thought to vary widely. The NTA estimated that in its 
last year of operation (2012/13) this ‘general’ funding contribution was £200 
million (source: review team evidence). In addition, interviewees said that there 
are often one-off ‘pots’ of national funding for short-term projects or specific 
issues that local areas can apply for (eg, services for people who sleep rough, 
Public Health England’s capital grants). We do not have a total figure for these 
national pots, but they appear not insignificant. 
There is very limited published description of other countries’ approach to 
funding drug treatment services, but it appears that the approach of a bespoke 
arrangement is not as ‘exceptionalist’ as it might initially appear. Several 
countries, including other UK countries, appear to take this approach as a way of 
funding diverse services that can go across administrative boundaries, requiring 
a range of partners to develop plans jointly and account for the money together. 
However, some approaches appear to be very complex (see, for example, 
Victoria State Government 2020). In England, piloting was carried out of a very 
complex (and unsuccessful) process for Payment by Results (Donmall et al. 
2019) and we heard in interviews that, as bespoke budgets became more 
embedded, so duplication increased (eg drugs-specific housing workers, 
employment advisers and so on in addition to the wider resources for these 
functions). Even in Wales, where the approach appears well co-ordinated so that 
various agencies come together to develop, fund and oversee local plans, we 
Improving drug treatment services in England 
 
The King’s Fund  23 
 
were told that the system is still complex and challenging (although that is 
based on individual views, not on a formal evaluation). It appears that care 
should be taken to keep the system simple and to avoid over-engineering. 
We heard that none of the infrastructure from the NTA exists now, so any 
creation of a bespoke budget would need to create processes and systems, as 
well as the national vehicle for allocating and tracking the money. There would 
be choices to make over whether a bespoke system only covers the formal 
treatment budget, or also includes other allocations and national ‘pots’ of 
funding. 
We considered ring-fencing of (some or all of) the drugs budget within the public 
health grant. We did not find examples of this elsewhere but that may just 
reflect the general sparsity of literature.  
Ring-fencing can potentially have the unintended consequences of ossifying 
service assumptions and inhibiting innovation, or undermining partnership 
approaches, but it equally has strong advocates, particularly in times of 
austerity. It is difficult to define ring-fences so tightly that there are no gaps or 
opportunities for gaming. Although ministers may criticise ring-fencing, in fact 
various budgets are ring-fenced, such as school budgets, and it is not an 
exceptional policy (Robertson et al 2017; Appleby and Hunter 2010). 
We looked into whether there could be a case for funding specialist services 
(inpatient detoxification, residential rehabilitation) differently from other services 
given their different (more clinical) nature and their high-cost/low-volume 
profile. We identified two main options. 
• In Scotland and Wales, the NHS retains the budget for these services. 
Budgets are not pooled but are aligned through local co-ordinating groups 
that plan, fund and oversee services for an area and are collectively 
accountable (source: review team evidence). 
• In English child and adolescent mental health services (CAMHS), there are 
similar concerns about the small number of providers able to offer high-
cost/low-volume specialist inpatient (‘tier 4’) services and a new approach 
has been developed, which although still new – it is too early to be 
definitive about impacts – has three key issues of interest. 
o Services are commissioned across several ICS areas – the equivalent 
of groups of upper-tier local authorities – because individual ICSs 
cannot guarantee sufficient volumes on their own to make a provider 
viable and will only use spot-purchasing, which lacks stability for 
providers, but by grouping together they can create a viable market. 
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o Although the tier 4 services are commissioned through a separate 
mechanism, local commissioners retain a central role in making sure 
that they join up with non-specialist services. It is not a case of 
simply taking them out of local commissioners’ responsibilities. 
o The approach in CAMHS is to make providers (both NHS and 
independent sector providers) responsible for working together to 
plan and assure access to tier 4 services (ie no commissioner). This 
may not be directly applicable to drug services as most CAMHS 
providers are NHS trusts with substantial capacity and connections 
into ICSs, but the potential to consider radically different approaches 
may be of interest (although in our interviews we did not discern an 
appetite for that) (Niche Health and Social Care Consulting 2019). 
We looked at Improving Access to Psychological Therapies (IAPT) as a potential 
model for commissioning tiers of services of different intensity across England. 
However, it quickly became apparent that this was a case of scaling up highly 
standardised services across areas with a known and relatively stable prevalence 
of needs, and would be unlikely to offer significant learning for drug services, 
which are more diverse, more tailored than a whole-population approach and 
where it is more challenging to assess needs (Department of Health 2008).  
Discussion  
Any discussion of funding systems must be within the context of the need to 
assure adequate levels of funding – a sophisticated funding system will not solve 
anything if funding levels are inadequate. For example, sexual health services 
are prescribed and whereas the legal mandate may have offered a degree of 
protection compared with non-prescribed services, ultimately services are still at 
risk due to significant budget cuts (see the case study in section 4).  
Equally, funding arrangements are not enough on their own unless other parts of 
the overall system design are in place – notably a definition of the outcomes that 
the funding is to be used for and accountability arrangements. Those other parts 
of system design are not discussed here but in the relevant sections of this 
report. 
A number of other countries (including other UK countries – see the case studies 
in section 4) have a bespoke system for funding drug treatment services (and 
prevention). This option might, at first glance, appear more effective, but in fact 
there is a risk that if not intentionally kept simple it will become overly complex 
(eg with a complex design to allow value-for-money assessments across 
different service types as in Australia, and Payment by Results – often 
abbreviated to PbR – as in England and the United States). Even the Welsh 
model – which appears good on paper – has been described to us as ‘unwieldy’. 
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Two significant downsides of a bespoke budget are: 
• potential overheads due to having to design and negotiate new processes, 
which could include negotiating for occasional funding from others’ 
budgets (eg rough sleeping services), with this being ‘taken off’ them and 
put into the drug treatment budget, which could create the risk of 
duplication (eg funding related to housing within the drug treatment 
budget, when there is also a wider housing department within the council)  
• the impact on the wider public health grant if drug treatment funding is 
taken out and treated separately. 
Ring-fencing all or some of the drug treatment budgets within the public health 
grant is the simplest option for protecting budgets, but it will not work in the 
longer term if the government removes ring-fencing of the public health grant. It 
is still unclear whether the government will actually remove the ring-fencing 
after repeated false starts (but we note the government has also made repeated 
commitments to do so in future) (Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local 
Government 2020a). Ring-fencing also has a similar effect to the bespoke 
budget option on the wider public health grant, removing councils’ flexibility, 
which in turn may create additional pressures on other budgets (such as sexual 
health) if councils need to create flexibility from them. Apart from its 
unpopularity with councils and the government, ring-fencing could potentially 
have the unintended consequences of ossifying service assumptions 
(discouraging innovation) or undermining the sense of equal partnership across 
the full range of partners. There are likely to be significant challenges in defining 
what would be within the ring-fence so that: 
• there are no gaps or opportunities for gaming 
• the definition is not narrowed down to just clinical interventions, with the 
risk that broader public health interventions that are important in the 
overall range of services for substance users could fall down a gap 
between different funding arrangements for drug treatment and health 
improvement. 
Having a range of different funding arrangements for different types of services 
could risk fragmenting where local areas have developed overall coherent 
approaches and is probably not a serious option other than for the particular 
case of inpatient detoxification and residential rehabilitation – the main high-
cost/low-volume services. Given the un-co-ordinated reduction in inpatient 
facilities that has been seen, there could be a case for commissioning these 
separately and, given their more (but not exclusively) clinical nature, for them to 
be commissioned in the NHS, as happens in other UK countries. Experience with 
tier 4 CAMHS suggests that it is possible to do so, with local commissioners (in 
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this case, the local authority drug treatment commissioners) retaining a central 
role in making sure the overall pathway of services coheres – in the case of 
CAMHS this may if anything have increased coherence rather than leading to 
fragmentation. Experience in Wales, where the NHS, the council and other 
partners each sit as members of a local board that collectively owns the 
approach, also suggests a potential mitigation of the fragmentation risk 
(although we do not have formal evaluation evidence).  
Learning from CAMHS also suggests it could be possible to conceive of different 
arrangements for specialist services so that they are commissioned separately 
from others but with the commissioning function still staying within councils, eg 
on a regional basis co-ordinated across several councils. If commissioning for 
these specialist services is delegated to the NHS, apart from potential short-term 
disruption and the potential for fragmentation, there are two main risks to 
consider.  
• The future direction for specialist commissioning in the NHS is very 
uncertain and it would not be a case of adding them into a pre-existing, 
stable arrangement.  
• Some of the options being developed in the NHS – such as provider 
collaboratives and strategic decisions made within ICSs – may not be the 
options that local authorities would have selected. 
We looked at the IAPT programme as an interesting framework that 
systematically ensured a range of tiered services in each area, and a workforce 
pipeline for them, but it does not seem likely that a similarly ‘formulaic’ 
approach could work across drug treatment given the wider range of services 
with a lack of standardisation.  
The model of ‘returning funding to the NHS’ is only included here for 
completeness. It is not realistic to frame it as a return to the NTA model; to do 
so would in effect require a new bespoke approach (the second model in Table 
1). Furthermore, interviewees expressed concern at the prospect of the NHS 
commissioning lower-tier non-clinical interventions and questioned whether the 
NHS was as well placed as councils are to promote partnership with the range of 
partner organisations that need to be involved. 
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Joint commissioning  
Key points 
• In 2013, joint commissioning arrangements for drug services (cross-
sector drug action teams) were disbanded. The sector is looking for new 
ways to get commissioners from the NHS, local government, the police 
and probation services to work together effectively. Evidence linking 
commissioning approaches to improvements in quality and outcomes is 
very limited, and therefore no single model emerges from the literature 
as the best approach. 
• There is agreement that different services should be commissioned over 
different population footprints, depending on their characteristics. 
Therefore for specialised inpatient drug treatment and rehabilitation 
services, which are low in volume, it might be appropriate to 
commission across multiple local authorities or an ICS. Most drug 
treatment services need to be commissioned at the local authority level 
because this is the geography at which effective joint working between 
public health teams, other parts of local authorities, the NHS, prisons 
and probation services is most easily facilitated. 
• Following the abolition of drug action teams, health and wellbeing 
boards were envisaged as the body that would develop integrated 
strategies for local areas. However, they cover all of health and 
wellbeing, and are not designed to have the commissioning or 
operational responsibilities that would be necessary to play a significant 
role in planning and delivering drug services across sectors. Other 
measures are therefore needed to ensure the effective joint 
commissioning of drug services across sectors. 
• There is consensus across other UK nations (and formerly England) that 
some form of formal partnership is needed to support effective drug 
treatment commissioning, including a local plan, aligned or pooled 
budgets, and collective accountability.  
• Differences in the geographies, relationships and resources in different 
parts of England mean that locally developed approaches to joint 
commissioning that build on existing system strengths are likely to be 
the most effective. The first step to effective joint working is agreeing 
what local partners want to achieve through consultation between 
commissioners, providers, patients/service users and communities. A 
plan can then be created that includes the right combination of 
governance and funding mechanisms to support achievement of that 
vision. However, an entirely bottom-up approach will not provide the 
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accountability needed to reduce variation and provide necessary 
assurance on spend. 
• Strong leadership and investment in building relationships across 
sectors are key success factors for joint commissioning (and system 
development more broadly). This takes time and requires stability in the 
system, which points to the need to invest in leadership development 
and commissioner capacity (see below) and not undertake major 
restructuring exercises unless the case for change is undeniable.  
The issue 
The Health and Social Care Act 2012 radically changed the way drug treatment 
services are commissioned and removed some of the mechanisms that 
supported joint working. Drug action teams – a structured approach to local 
commissioning and cross-sector co-ordination that involved senior leaders from 
health, local authorities, the police and probation services – were disbanded and 
the drugs-specific pooled budget they controlled was subsumed into the public 
health grant. 
Local authorities now hold responsibility for co-ordinating commissioning efforts 
and health and wellbeing boards are envisaged as the body that will develop 
integrated strategies for local areas. There is a widely held view that this vision 
has not been realised in most parts of the country as health and wellbeing 
boards do not have the commissioning or operational responsibilities previously 
held by drug action teams. The result is a fragmented system in which people 
with complex needs – include people with mental health problems, people with 
long-term conditions, homeless people and people with drug problems – are in 
some cases not having those needs met. 
To address this, the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs (ACMD) highlights 
the need for better links between drug treatment and clinical commissioning 
group (CCG) and sustainability and transformation partnership planning 
(Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs 2017) 
Commissioning approaches differ across the country. We heard during interviews 
that some areas have managed to maintain a degree of partnership working 
following the reforms created by the Health and Social Care Act 2012. This was 
largely attributed to cultural factors, such as long-standing good working 
relationships and partners having ‘faith’ in each other. In other areas, previous 
arrangements have disappeared and planning has suffered as a consequence.  
Concepts/models  
In Table 2 we outline the strengths and weaknesses of different potential models 
for joint commissioning. We have included a mix of formal and informal models 
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– some relate to joint strategic planning and some to joint commissioning (which 
includes planning, procurement and monitoring). The table is not based on a 
comprehensive analysis of every option; rather, we have brought together key 
points from our analysis so far. 
Table 2 Potential joint commissioning models and their strengths and 
weaknesses 






partnership or other 
forum where senior 
leaders with 
responsibilities relating 
to drug services come 
together to jointly plan 
and commission drug 
services – the drug 
action teams in place 
before 2013 are an 
example of this 
Can bring together 
senior leaders from 
all relevant sectors 
Provides significant 






Would require extra 
investment as it 
represents an 






capacity to recreate 
and cause 
disruption to 
current staff roles 
and responsibilities 
Could promote 














A health and wellbeing 
board is a formal 
committee of the local 
authority that brings 
together leaders from 
the local health and 
care system to work 
together to promote 
integration and improve 
Broad membership 
that covers the 
areas pertinent to 
drug services – 
involves leaders 




It is a partnership 
forum, not an 
executive decision-
making body 
Does not have the 
commissioning or 
operational 
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health and wellbeing for 
their local population 
Has a broad lens 




affecting the health 
and wellbeing of 
local populations 
Existing forum so 
no disruption 




Wide agenda across 
health and care, so 
does not have the 
bandwidth to 
undertake 
significant work on 
drug services 
Wide variation in 









NHS providers and 
commissioners, local 
authorities and other 
local partners to 
collectively plan and 
integrate care to meet 
the needs of their 
population 
The geographical 
footprint of ICSs varies 
but they tend to cover a 
larger area than a 
health and wellbeing 
board, meaning most 
cover an area of more 
than one local authority.  
An ICS might be 






rehabilitation – this 
allows efficiencies 
from pooling staff 
expertise and 
resources 
The area covered 
by an ICS is in 
many cases too 
large to facilitate 
effective joint 
planning for most 
aspects of drug 
service 
commissioning 
Services are better 
commissioned 





address local needs 
and those involved 
in designing a 
service are closer 
to the communities 
they serve 
Local authorities 
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in most places 
Work on ‘place’-
level planning is 
devolved to local 
authorities/CCGs or 




to a lead 
commissioner 
This is usually 
accompanied by a 
pooled or aligned 
budget arrangement – 
either the local 
authority or CCG 
commissions a range of 
connected services on 
behalf of the other 
organisation 
Supports a focus 
on outcomes across 
the pathway  
Relatively 
straightforward to 






duplicated effort by 
multiple 
commissioners 
May not be possible 




CCG(s) and local 
authority 
Commissioner still 
needs to develop 
an approach for 
working with other 
sectors to ensure 
services provided 
across the NHS, 
local government, 
probation services 
and prisons address 






Rather than mandating 
a particular approach to 
joint working, local 
areas can be required to 
work out the 
arrangements that work 
best for them – sexual 
health services is an 
example of an area 
where NHS England and 
NHS Improvement have 
asked commissioners to 
collaborate but the 
format for this has been 







Evidence shows no 
single model is 
effective in 
supporting joint 
planning and that 
impact depends on 
More difficult to 
oversee and hold to 
account as no one 
model to test 
progress against 
Requires high levels 
of trust  
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left to local areas to 
decide (see section 4) 
local history and 
context 
Evidence 
The past three decades have been characterised by repeated reorganisations of 
the way health, social and public health care are commissioned across the NHS 
and local authorities in England. These have brought changes to who 
commissions what, the area over which they commission, the financial 
arrangements used to reimburse providers for care, and the approaches taken to 
encourage joint working between commissioners.  
No single model has emerged as an effective way of delivering high-quality, 
efficient care that is co-ordinated around patients’ needs. Evidence that links 
commissioning approaches to the cost and quality of health care services is very 
limited (Gardner et al. 2016). This challenge is not restricted to England – health 
and care systems around the world have struggled to develop effective 
commissioning arrangements (Klasa et al. 2018; Ham 2008). 
Commissioning over different geographical footprints 
One recurring challenge for commissioners is finding the optimal geographical 
footprint for commissioning. This requires a balance to be struck between the 
economies of scale that flow from commissioning over large areas (which 
includes the ability to pool expertise and patients in service areas with low 
volumes), and the local insight, engagement and tailoring that can occur when 
services are commissioned at a smaller scale, closer to the community being 
served. The current prevailing view is that different types of services should be 
commissioned over different population footprints (Lorne et al. 2019; National 
Audit Office 2018). 
Figure 1 identifies three distinct service types:  
• regional (low-volume, high-cost services that are highly interdependent 
with others) 
• local multi-agency (where joint working is key) 
• local simple (which can be commissioned in a fairly discrete and simple 
way). 
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Figure 1 Different levels and types of commissioning 
Broadly speaking, it would appear that specialist drug treatment services may fit 
the criteria for regional single services and local multi-agency services reflect the 
landscape when drug action teams existed. Further, although it may seem that 
drug treatment services sit under ‘local simple service’, we appreciate they are 
far from ‘simple’. Overall, it is important to consider full use of all the options 
shown. 
Over the past year, ICSs, which bring together commissioners and providers 
from the NHS and local authorities to plan collectively, have been rethinking 
commissioning arrangements and mapping out which services should be 
commissioned over which population footprint. NHS England and NHS 
Improvement have defined footprints over which services can be commissioned 
as neighbourhoods, places or systems (NHS England and NHS Improvement 
2019). 
The King’s Fund has recently analysed the planning approaches within ICSs, and 
found that they have been approaching this question with a strong emphasis on 
subsidiarity – the idea that decisions should be made as close as possible to the 
local communities they affect, and that they should only be led across larger 
geographies where there is a clear reason to do so, or they cannot be carried out 
at a local level (Charles et al. forthcoming). 
The work of ICSs is at an early stage and, as yet, there is no ‘right’ approach. 
However, it is clear that the division of responsibilities must be left to local areas 
to determine, given the wide variation in their characteristics and geographies.  
Improving drug treatment services in England 
 
The King’s Fund  34 
 
The level at which a service is commissioned affects which planning organisation 
within the NHS a local authority should seek to work with. The process of 
identifying the right NHS partner is complicated by frequent changes to NHS 
planning structures. In November 2020, NHS England and NHS Improvement 
proposed further changes backed up by proposals for new legislation, which are 
currently being consulted on (see section 5 for more detail) (NHS England and 
NHS Improvement 2020). For NHS commissioning, it is proposed that CCG 
functions may be subsumed into ICSs and that joint working at the place level 
between NHS commissioners and local authorities is strengthened. It is proposed 
that the role of commissioning will change in three ways: 
• ensuring a single, system-wide approach to undertaking strategic 
commissioning, including assessing population health needs and planning 
how to address those needs  
• provider organisations and others, through partnerships (including 
provider collaboratives), agreeing the future service model and structure 
of provision jointly through ICS governance 
• greater focus on population health and collective system ownership of the 
financial envelope. 
The implications for drug treatment services of the evidence on joint 
commissioning are twofold. 
• It is important to explore commissioning specialist services across a larger 
population footprint, eg groupings of local authorities or at the ICS level. 
• It is important for drug treatment service commissioners to understand 
the impact of subsidiarity on health services that drug treatment needs to 
join up with, eg mental health care.  
 
Current structures for joint planning 
Before 2013, drug service commissioning was conducted via a bespoke model of 
joint planning, through drug action teams – cross-sector partnerships of senior 
leaders from local authorities, the NHS, the police and probation services that 
were responsible for planning and commissioning services paid for with a ring-
fenced pooled budget. Following implementation of the Health and Social Care 
Act 2012, the sector moved to a generic model where commissioning is 
increasingly conducted by commissioners who span a number of areas, and joint 
planning and strategic co-ordination are left to the health and wellbeing board, 
which is responsible for joint partnership working across health and care. 
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Health and wellbeing boards have a statutory duty to produce a joint strategic 
needs assessment with CCGs and a joint health and wellbeing strategy for their 
local population, but their formal powers are limited – they are constituted as a 
partnership forum rather than an executive decision-making body (Humphries 
2019; Humphries and Galea 2013). This means that they do not have the 
operational or commissioning responsibilities necessary to be effective in 
ensuring co-ordinated joint commissioning arrangements for drug services. 
Health and wellbeing boards vary in how they operate and how effective they 
are across the country. However, in most places, there is little evidence that 
health and wellbeing boards have had a significant influence over the 
development of sustainability and transformation partnerships and ICSs 
(Humphries 2019). For drug service commissioners looking to engage more with 
the NHS and its current planning structures, they do not appear to be the best 
route at the moment in most parts of the country. 
Based on separate analysis by the review team of the structures for drug 
treatment service commissioning and planning in place in Northern Ireland, 
Scotland and Wales (as well as the evidence about former structures in England 
such as the NTA and drug action teams) (see section 4 for more detail), it is 
clear that some form of formal partnership is necessary. This partnership would 
need to be ‘corralled’ around a place-based plan and would require the co-
ordination or pooling of different budgets as well as a mechanism for holding 
partners to account. According to the drug treatment service commissioners we 
spoke to, this has been made possible in some areas through strong 
relationships that had been built up over time. However, an entirely ‘bottom-up’ 
approach does not automatically include collective accountability and there are 
serious risks to consider, such as major variation in quality and weak 
mechanisms for co-ordinating or pooling budgets.  
Different approaches to joint working  
Joint planning is a key element of an effective commissioning function – but 
there is no single ‘model’ for doing this. Joint commissioning arrangements can 
include a mix of collaborative approaches to needs assessment, decision-making 
and paying for services. In Table 3 we have outlined some of the common 
features of joint commissioning arrangements identified in a review of joint 
working across health and social care (Humphries and Wenzel 2015; Dickinson 
et al 2013). Where possible, we have also provided examples of what these 
features look like in practice.  
Table 3 Common features of joint commissioning arrangements, with 
practice examples 
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Feature What this looks like in practice 
Formalised structures • Integrated organisations, 
management teams or formal 
partnerships 
• Drug action teams were an 
example of this, as are the 
arrangements in place in other 
parts of the UK (see Table 2 earlier 
in this section, and case studies 
from other UK countries in section 
4) 
Pooled budgets • Associated with a particular 
population or disease group with 
needs that span organisations 
• Some organisations choose to 
align rather than pool their 
budgets, which means information 
is shared between organisations 
and priorities and strategies are 
agreed jointly, but management of 
the individual budgets, monitoring 
and reporting remain separate – 
this is often an interim step to 
pooling. Sometimes used because 
of difficulties in accounting rules 
around pooled budgets. 
• See the sexual health services 
case study in section 4 for an 
example of this 
• In terms of drug treatment 
services, budgets could potentially 
be pooled across a whole drugs 
strategy or for specific aspects of 
treatment, such as mental health 
care  
Lead commissioning arrangements • One partner takes the lead on 
commissioning on behalf of the 
others, to a jointly agreed set of 
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aims – permitted by section 75 of 
the NHS Act 2006 
• Often accompanied by a pooled 
budget  
• See the sexual health services 
case study in section 4 for an 
example from Lambeth, Southwark 
and Lewisham 
• In terms of drug treatment 
services, there could be a lead 
commissioner where there are co-
existing substance misuse and 
mental health (or other) issues 
Co-location of staff involved in joint 
commissioning 
• CCG and local authority 
commissioning teams working in 
the same location 
• Can be accompanied by a vision or 
ambition for ‘one system, one 
budget’ (Institute of Public Care 
2018) 
• In Brighton and Hove, CCG and 
local authority commissioners 
found some advantages to co-
location, although they 
acknowledged co-location on its 
own is not the answer – 
partnership working requires effort  




• Health and wellbeing boards are 
responsible for producing a joint 
strategic needs assessment and a 
joint health and wellbeing strategy 
that meet the current and future 
needs of the local population 
• They are also required to consider 
using NHS Act 2006 flexibilities, 
such as pooled budgets, in order to 
meet these needs 
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The impact of these arrangements tends to be dependent on implementation 
and the local context within which they are operating. Formal partnership 
structures that might appear to break down barriers between organisations 
sometimes do not have that impact in practice. For example, the drug action 
teams that undertook the joint commissioning of drug services before 2013 did 
not always manage to break out of organisational silos. Evaluation and 
commentary at the time highlighted issues with a lack of co-ordinated care 
(Valios 2004) and all stakeholders participating in decisions (Commission for 
Healthcare Audit and Inspection 2008). Sometimes the least formal aspects of a 
joint commissioning model can be critical to promoting collaboration – the box 
below outlines an informal approach to collaboration in South Tyneside that is 
seen as the crucible of its whole-system working across the NHS, local 
government and beyond. 
An informal collaborative approach to planning in South Tyneside 
South Tyneside has developed a collaborative approach to planning and 
decision-making that involves leaders from across its health and care system. It 
includes formal structures, like the Alliance Business Group, which oversees 
integrated working and is accountable to the health and wellbeing board, and 
the Joint Commissioning Unit, which is jointly run by the CCG and council and 
manages around a quarter of the CCG’s budget. 
However, the most innovative part of the model is also the least formal – the 
Alliance Leadership Team. This is a concept borrowed from the Canterbury 
health system in New Zealand – an international innovator on integrated working 
(Charles 2017). The Alliance Leadership Team includes senior leaders from the 
CCG, local authority, acute trust, mental health trust, commissioning support 
unit, voluntary and community sector, local Healthwatch and primary care 
networks. The team holds a three-hour meeting each month, which has no 
agenda, no papers, no minutes and no decision-making power. Discussions at 
the meetings focus on ‘themes’ and are more about how the different 
organisations work together as a system than what they do. When the team 
identify opportunities to improve things in the system and eliminate blockages, 
these are then passed on to others for action.  
This approach has been credited with creating a positive culture of collaborative 
working among senior staff and with supporting real improvements in their 
system. One participant described it as the ‘crucible’ for joint working in the 
area, helping to shift staff mindsets from protecting the interests of their 
organisation to protecting the interests of the whole system. The approach has 
also been linked to tangible changes, such as improvements to South Tyneside’s 
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continuing healthcare programme, which has delivered significant savings 
(although clearly causality is difficult to prove). 
The new way of working required a significant investment of staff time and the 
relationships between the group and ways of working took time to develop (and 
this work was supported by an independent facilitator). The approach was 
greeted with quite a lot of scepticism at first, but much of this has fallen away as 
some of the tangible benefits of the approach have become clearer. 
For more information about the approach to collaborative planning in South 
Tyneside, see Robertson and Ewbank (2020). 
Research about joint commissioning mostly describes local approaches and 
examines key barriers and enablers to joint working. There is very little rigorous 
evidence of the impact of joint approaches on the cost and quality of care and 
each example of joint working is different in the combination of factors that 
come together to make up the joint commissioning model. Therefore, this area is 
not amenable to a list of alternative models with pros and cons. Instead, it is an 
area where components of a model can be set out along with key factors for 
success. 
Key success factors for joint commissioning include the following. 
• Strong and stable leadership and a commitment to joint working from 
senior leaders and middle management are seen as essential (Newman et 
al. 2012). Because of the need to navigate all the processes for joint 
commissioning and make them ‘fit’ to local circumstances, it is very 
important to have this strong and stable leadership. Leadership is also the 
key to ensuring that all the other success factors (described below) are in 
place. However, leadership is a factor that is often not present due to 
repeated reorganisation of the commissioning system and the loss of 
experienced staff that accompanies those changes. 
• A clear shared vision is the critical first step. Local areas can then work 
back from that to develop arrangements that will help facilitate the agreed 
goals. If commissioners start by designing the joint commissioning model, 
and agree on its purpose after that, they risk collaboration becoming an 
end in itself (Dickinson and Glasby 2013). 
• Whatever approach is taken it should focus on the development of long-
term relationships between commissioners and providers and the 
communities they serve, and this requires investment over many years 
(Robertson and Ewbank 2020). Almost every case study of joint 
commissioning arrangements cites long-standing positive relationships as 
a key factor underpinning success because of the trust required to make 
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these approaches work, which must be built up over time (Newman et al 
2012; Miller et al 2011; Audit Commission 2009). 
• It is important to have a shared vision and a common set of objectives 
agreed by the partners (Newman et al. 2012). 
• Clinical involvement is a key feature of effective commissioning 
arrangements. It supports innovation and adds value through bringing 
frontline insights into planning decisions (McDermott et al 2015; Miller et 
al 2015). The NHS has tried numerous different approaches to effectively 
involving clinicians in commissioning over the past three decades and is 
yet to settle on a best approach. Some drug treatment services are 
clinical in nature and any new system for effectively commissioning them 
must involve a range of clinicians who deliver this type of care.  
• Engagement with patients, service users and the local community 
is important (Naylor and Wellings 2019; Newman et al 2012). Wigan is an 
example of a local authority that has taken a radical approach to working 
with the community and working jointly to shape their agenda. 
• There is emerging evidence that a shift away from the more ‘transactional’ 
model of commissioning towards a ‘collaborative’ approach, where 
commissioners work to facilitate joint working between commissioners 
and providers, rather than promoting competition, can be effective 
(Robertson and Ewbank 2020; Collins 2019b; Davidson-Knight et al 
2017). We conducted research in 2019 with three English areas that were 
starting to develop this approach – the key elements of this new 
collaborative approach to commissioning are outlined in Table 4 
(Robertson and Ewbank 2020). This move away from top-down 
commissioning to approaches that involve a different set of skills 
(facilitation, clinical expertise, etc) and involve others in making 
commissioning decisions (clinicians, providers, service users) may point to 
a need for external support for commissioners to develop in a fast-
changing environment. We discuss this in Section 3, ‘Commissioner 
capacity and capability’, p 50. 
Table 4 A changing approach to commissioning 
From… To… 
Health care focus Population health focus 
Organisational focus System focus 
Contract enforcer System enabler 
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Transactions Relationships and behaviours 
Decision-maker Convener for collective decisions 
High bureaucracy, low trust Low bureaucracy, high trust 
Monitoring organisational performance Monitoring system-wide performance and 
providing improvement support 
Following national guidance Developing local solutions 
Source: Robertson and Ewbank 2020 
  
Improving drug treatment services in England 
 
The King’s Fund  42 
 
New contracting approaches 
Key points 
• New contracting approaches – such as ‘prime’ and ‘alliance’ models – 
have been developed to promote better joint working between 
commissioners and a range of providers across the NHS and local 
authorities. However, they will not – by themselves – overcome 
differences in organisational interests and relationship problems. 
• ‘Prime’ contract models, which devolve responsibility for commissioning 
to a provider or group of providers who then subcontract with others, 
require the prime provider to have the capacity and skills to undertake 
commissioning tasks. In some local areas these skills may not be 
present and the model will not be viable.  
• Developing and implementing these new contracting models is usually a 
long and costly process and meaningful outcome measures can be 
difficult to define, particularly for complex populations like drug users. 
The models can also be particularly difficult for small organisations to 
engage with, and this can be a barrier to the involvement of some third 
sector organisations. Commissioners must ensure that whatever 
contracting approach they choose, valuable input from small charities is 
not lost. 
• Rather than focusing on developing contracts to promote integration, 
some commissioners are starting to take a more collaborative and 
facilitative approach – working with providers to jointly agree a local 
vision and develop services rather than focusing on arm’s-length 
contract negotiations. Collaborative approaches are in their early stages, 
but there are examples of NHS and local authority commissioners and 
providers starting to work together in this way to make best use of 
scarce system resources and minimise unnecessary transaction costs. 
More broadly, NHS policy development is moving away from 
transactional approaches to commissioning towards more collaborative 
models and legislation has been proposed to remove some of the 
competition requirements that currently affect the sector. 
• If contract models are going to be used to promote integration, the first 
step should always be a dialogue between commissioners, providers, 
patients and the wider community to develop a vision for the service 
area/group. Commissioners can then work backwards from that vision 
to build a contracting model that delivers its aspirations. 
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The issue 
Some drug services are not co-ordinated around the needs of service users. 
Budgets have been cut and commissioners in some areas are no longer working 
effectively together across the NHS, local authorities, prisons and probation 
services. There is a question as to whether new contracting approaches could 
help support better joint working and overcome some of these issues. 
Concepts/models 
A range of new contract models have been developed in the NHS and local 
authorities to incentivise providers to work together and deliver more co-
ordinated care and better outcomes. They tend to include whole-population 
budgets (that cover a particular age group or disease group, for example), 
transfer both risk and reward to providers and reward providers for good 
performance. In Table 5 we have outlined the strengths and weaknesses of each 
contractual approach. 









contracts with a single 
organisation (or group of 
organisations) known as 
the ‘prime contractor’. 
They are typically given a 
fully capitated budget, a 
proportion of which is 
dependent on achieving 
certain outcomes, and 
the prime contractor 
subcontracts with other 
providers to deliver the 
agreed service. The 
prime contractor takes 
responsibility for 
designing a delivery 
model and patient 
pathway that will most 
effectively meet the 
terms of the contract. 
Simple for the 
commissioner to 
manage – they 
outsource their 
contract management 
function to a prime 
contractor 
Enables the prime 
contractor to manage 
care across a pathway 
Can stimulate 
transformation of the 
delivery model 
To facilitate this, 
money can move 
within the pathway 
Shifts clinical 
accountability to the 
High financial and 
relational risks for 
the prime contractor 
Concern over the 
management of co-
morbidities and over 
issues that cross 
boundaries 
Providers may lack 




Can create perverse 
incentives – it may 
limit patient choice 
and encourage 
‘cream skimming’ 
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The prime contractor 
becomes the service 
‘integrator’. In the ‘prime 
provider’ variant of this 
model, the ‘prime 
contractor’ also provides 
services. 









This is a variant of the 
prime contractor model 
where the prime 
contractor also provides 
some or all of the 
services within the 
contract. 
In addition to 
what’s above 
Intended to limit 
fragmentation that 
would be caused by 
introducing a new 
actor 
In addition to 
what’s above 
Could lead to a 
provider monopoly if 
it decides to provide 




A set of providers enter a 
single agreement with 
the commissioner. The 
commissioner and all 
providers in the alliance 
share risk and 
responsibility for meeting 
the terms of the single 
contract. There are no 
subcontracts and internal 
governance 
arrangements manage 
the relationships and 
delivery of care. 




with the commissioner. 
These contracts are most 
suitable where there are 
well-established provider 
relationships. 
Strong incentives to 
collaborate and work 
together to identify 
efficiencies across the 
system (rather than 
just within their 
organisation) 
Avoids the dominance 











Shared financial and 
clinical risk is reliant 
on the performance 
of other providers 
More complex for 
commissioners to 
manage 
Reliant on high trust 
and existing strong 
relationships 
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Links a proportion of 
payment to the 
achievement of a set of 
defined outcomes. These 
outcomes are shared 
across multiple providers. 
Contracts vary in the 
proportion of the 





to work together, 
shifting their focus 




metrics that can be 
accurately measured 
is challenging 
Potential for gaming 
outcomes 
Withholds funds 
from providers that 
achieve worse 
outcomes, which 
could lead to a 
vicious cycle of 
decline 
Source: Lewis and Agathangelou 2018; Addicott 2014 
Evidence/discussion 
A number of places around the country are exploring the use of new contracting 
models to support collaboration – both within the NHS and across the NHS and 
local authorities (Sanderson et al. 2016). The empirical research base on the 
impact of these models within the NHS is still developing – some areas seem to 
have found using them helpful (Clark et al. 2015). 
However, evidence from evaluations of the use of different contracting 
approaches shows that a contractual model is ‘scaffolding’ and does not replace 
or short-cut the need to build trust and good relationships to deliver co-
ordinated care for patients (Addicott 2014). New contractual models can play an 
important role in facilitating reconfiguration and the better use of resources. 
However, they do not address the underlying problems that organisations 
experience when they try to work together – they are a mechanism to help 
strengthen attempts at collective working, but will not overcome significant 
differences in individual organisations’ interests (Sanderson et al. 2019). 
Case studies from the NHS and local authorities found that pre-existing 
difficulties in the relationships between providers and commissioners were not 
remedied by the development of these new contractual models, although there 
was some evidence that relationships between providers improved as they 
gained more familiarity with and understanding of each other by working 
together (Sanderson et al. 2019). Financial incentives – however they are 
engineered – rarely deliver the hoped-for integration benefits. Successful case 
studies are often the result of factors like positive relationships between sectors 
that have been built up over years and stable leadership across sectors. 
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New approaches need to be developed through continual dialogue with 
providers, patients and the wider community. Once a vision is agreed, 
commissioners and providers can work backwards from that point to build a 
model that delivers on the aspirations of the vision (Addicott 2014). 
Designing and implementing new contractual models is a long and costly process 
and does not always result in the agreement of formal contractual arrangements 
(Sanderson et al. 2019; Addicott 2014). The amount spent devising elaborate 
incentive schemes can outweigh the likely benefits – the most obvious case 
being the UnitingCare contract in Cambridgeshire and Peterborough for older 
people’s and adult community services, which collapsed after eight months and 
cost £9.8 million to develop (National Audit Office 2016). The Payment by 
Results pilots undertaken in drug and alcohol services were costly to implement 
and did not achieve improvements in some of the outcome measures targeted 
by the approach (University of Manchester et al. 2017). It is therefore critical 
that any new contracting approach is designed in a way that means the costs of 
development do not outweigh the benefits of implementation.  
The number of commissioners for drug services has reduced in recent years, 
raising the issue of whether there is sufficient capacity to implement this kind of 
contracting approach. One of the commissioners we spoke to as part of this 
research highlighted the value of regional specialist support from Public Health 
England on the design of contracts. 
Contractual models that involve providers coming together to bid for services 
require each provider to have the capacity and skills to get involved in that 
process. This means it can be difficult for small providers – such as small 
community-based charities that hold critical links and knowledge about the 
needs of local users – to engage in these types of contractual arrangements 
(Sanderson et al. 2019; Baird et al. 2018). Commissioners must work to engage 
smaller organisations and facilitate their involvement if these contractual 
approaches are to be successful. 
Outcomes-based contracting – where a proportion of the payment given to a 
group of providers is contingent on achieving a set of system-wide outcomes – 
has the potential to provoke collaboration between providers and to shift their 
focus from organisational interests to the system as a whole (and the people 
within that system). However, evidence so far suggests that outcomes-based 
contracting is harder to implement than may have been anticipated, partly 
because outcomes are not easy to specify (Collins 2019b), and some important 
elements of care are not easily captured in an outcome measure (Collins 2019a). 
These challenges have also been identified beyond the health, care and public 
health system, in other public service areas like employment and probation 
services (Tomkinson 2016). In the NHS, these contracts have often only made a 
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small proportion of the payment dependent on outcomes, limiting the incentive 
to work jointly towards system goals (Sanderson et al. 2019). The failure of the 
Payment by Results pilot for drug services to lead to improvements in some of 
the specified measures shows how difficult it is to make this approach work in 
complex service areas like drugs (University of Manchester et al. 2017). 
Reasons why contracting processes like this in the NHS have stalled include: 
providers not trusting the financial model, a lack of robust activity data and a 
lack of alignment in providers’ interests (Sanderson et al. 2019). 
If commissioners are considering adopting these models they need to:  
• clarify the capacity of participating organisations to share risk 
• consider how resource intensive the process is likely to be 
• consider the implications of the chosen model for third sector involvement 
(small providers may find it difficult to take part)  
• think about whether the system is ready for this type of model – are 
organisational interests aligned and are providers willing to work together 
(Sanderson et al. 2019)? 
The underlying principles or ‘terms’ of the contracts can be more important than 
the broad contracting model. These must include outcomes being built into the 
contracts and the contract terms requiring providers to focus on service 
integration (and not just organisational integration), including streamlining care 
and working across the gaps between providers, and working together efficiently 
for the benefit of patients (Addicott 2014). 
Some commissioners are developing new approaches that focus on collaborative 
relationships rather than arm’s-length contracting negotiations. This means 
resources that were previously dedicated to contracting can be shifted to 
improvement support. There are examples of NHS and local authority 
commissioners starting to develop this model of working (see the box on the 
South Tyneside approach in subsection 3.2) (Robertson and Ewbank 2020; 
Collins 2019b).  
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Commissioner capacity and capability 
Key points 
• The capacity and capability that commissioners need in order to be 
effective are determined by the models of care and outcomes a system 
wants to achieve through commissioning. The number of commissioners 
needed and how specialised their skills should be cannot be assessed in 
isolation but require some form of local strategy to be in place. 
• More evidence is needed, but that available so far suggests that there 
needs to be national policy leadership for the approach to drug 
treatment, with a workforce strategy to support it. There are choices 
about how much detail to set out from the centre, but the evidence we 
have seen suggests that in any option a degree of national 
infrastructure will need to be built up over time to support workforce 
development. 
• Whatever approach is taken, it is essential to assure basic capacity for 
effective commissioning, such as access to knowledge about substance 
use and treatment services, sufficient time to develop relationships with 
providers and both the time and skills (eg data analysis skills) to carry 
out thorough needs assessment. 
• This report focuses on the capacity and capability of commissioners, but 
we noted that there are also concerns about the capacity and capability 
of the wider drug treatment workforce. 
• Although NHS commissioning support units do not offer a model 
because of the variable ways in which they have been implemented, the 
basic concept of a national framework of ambitions/expectations for 
commissioning together with regional centres of support and expert 
advice for commissioners warrants consideration. Public Health 
England’s regional centres appear to have something potentially 
approaching that regional role in some cases. 
The issue  
There are concerns about the capacity of commissioners to be effective in 
commissioning drug treatment services, and their skills (Advisory Committee on 
the Misuse of Drugs 2017). Those concerns are associated with factors such as 
short-term contracts and the weakness of strategic partnerships with NHS, 
justice and other related services. 
In the past, the NTA’s workforce strategy focused on increasing capacity, 
improving competence and career pathways, and mainstreaming drug and 
alcohol skills (Home Office and National Treatment Agency 2006). In interviews 
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and in literature this has been described as a significant move to professionalise 
drug treatment services, including commissioning (Duke 2010). The workforce 
strategy was part of the overall national infrastructure to deliver the NTA’s 
model of care (National Treatment Agency 2006) and built on a set of national 
occupational standards (Skills for Health 2014).  
We have also considered the Improving Access to Psychological Therapies (IAPT) 
approach as another model for building up a specialist national workforce within 
the health sector. But other UK countries appear to be developing strategic 
frameworks for developing the workforce that may not be as detailed as the NTA 
or IAPT approaches (eg Scottish Government 2010). 
The NHS has taken a different path to support the development of 
commissioners’ capacity and capability, establishing commissioning support units 
– which have evolved differently in different regions – and providing a national 
Commissioning Capability Programme (NHS England undated). 
Concepts/models  
In Table 6 we outline different potential options (or models) that we have 
reviewed for improving commissioner capacity and capability for drug services as 
well as the strengths and weaknesses of each. 
Table 6: Potential models for improving commissioner capacity and 
capability and the strengths and weaknesses of each 






National plan, as part of 
a suite of initiatives, 
aiming to significantly 
increase capacity and 
capability 
Appears to have 
driven change 
This level of detail 
in a national role 
required national 
resources 
IAPT approach National assumptions and 
a funding formula for the 
number of staff at each 
tier of treatment for 






Not easy to apply 
to drug treatment 
and commissioning 





A framework (less 
detailed/prescriptive than 
the NTA strategy) 
designed to support and 
work with local 
approaches 
Too early, not 
clear yet 




Units contracted to 
support CCGs with advice 








adaptation to each 
Commissioning 
support units are 
for all CCG 
commissioning – 
drug treatment is 
not big enough to 
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The joint NTA/Home Office workforce strategy sat alongside the NTA’s models of 
care and guidance for local areas and the roles of NTA regional offices in 
supporting their implementation (Home Office and National Treatment Agency 
2006). It was a key point in an ongoing trend since the 1980s, further 
accelerating a pattern of increasing the professionalisation and formality of drug 
treatment roles, as well as the number (Duke 2010). It built on national 
occupational standards that had been developed by Skills for Health, and 
commissioning standards developed by the Substance Misuse Advisory Service, 
and itself led to the development of National Vocational Qualifications (NVQ) in 
health and social care and working with offending behaviour, as well as other 
qualifications and certifications (Skills for Health 2014; Substance Misuse 
Advisory Service 2000; Duke 2010). It was therefore embedded within a 
multifaceted and dynamic approach. 
Scotland appears to be taking a similar approach in the sense of setting out a 
strategy and then developing capabilities in the workforce, data and an 
‘outcomes toolkit’ to support its implementation (Scottish Government 2010). As 
with the NTA’s approach, this process has taken several years. At present it is 
too early to judge its effectiveness; a full workforce strategy is still in 
development (apparently forthcoming) and there is still only a ‘statement’. 
However, the Scottish approach is intuitively appropriate in that it does not focus 
on workforce capacity or capability in isolation but in the context of clear 
strategic goals and the development of data to measure progress towards them. 
The English system currently lacks clarity of overall goals and while there is 
performance data, there is no mapping of who is commissioning what so that 
connections could be made between outcomes and different approaches to 
service provision and commissioning.  
Our literature search on commissioners’ capacity and capability returned 81 
documents, none of which turned out to be specifically about the competencies 
that commissioners needed. Most documents seemed to focus on the drug 
treatment workforce as a whole or specifically in providers. In discussion with 
commissioners, participants were strongly of the opinion that drug treatment 
commissioning required specialist rather than generic knowledge and skills 
(although it should be noted they were mostly commissioners with specialist 
knowledge and skills). They indicated views that those specialist skills might be 
transferable to commissioning other services but that specialist skills in 
commissioning other service areas (eg sexual health) would not be sufficient for 
drug treatment. They criticised examples where they considered that individuals 
in certain local authority areas had been tasked with recommissioning drug 
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treatment as a ‘project’ without being personally connected to the local drug 
treatment system. Phase one of the Independent Review of Drugs noted a 
decline in skills, expertise and capacity in the drugs sector as a whole (not 
singling out commissioners), and of the responses to the review’s call for 
evidence that we were able to review, a large number commented on the need 
to invest in training for the workforce but only two specifically focused on 
commissioners and the perceived need for specialist rather than generic skills 
(Black 2020). Overall, literature and information collected as part of the 
independent review support the need to further develop the drugs workforce and 
indicate concern about commissioners’ capacity and capability within this, but 
without specific or rigorous evidence to reach a conclusion on commissioners. 
The IAPT programme was of interest for this report as it rapidly increased both 
workforce capacity and capability across a sector (Department of Health 2008). 
However, it became apparent that parallels are limited; the treatments and 
workforce needed for IAPT are far more amenable to standardisation than drug 
treatment, and the focus of IAPT is exclusively on providers. We have not 
identified any other alternative models to the relatively long-term, 
interdependent approach of developing the workforce as part of a broad 
strategy, as exemplified by the NTA and the Scottish government. 
We considered commissioning support units because of their role specifically in 
supporting commissioners’ capability, but they similarly have few parallels other 
than the very high-level principle of potential value from regional sources of 
advice (NHS England undated). We do note, however, that the recent proposals 
from NHS England and NHS Improvement about the future of ICSs highlight the 
positive impact so far of commissioning support units in terms of ‘quality and 
value for money’. It is also proposed that commissioning support units will 
continue to play an important role in supporting ICSs, for example by ‘providing 
economies of scale which may include joining up with provider back office 
functions where appropriate and helping to shape services through a customer 
board arrangement’ (NHS England and NHS Improvement 2020, p 24). 
Discussion  
Although there has been no formal evaluation, it appears that the NTA workforce 
strategy did lead to increases in staffing and perceived greater 
professionalisation of the sector. However, none of the infrastructure or 
resources at the national level that stood behind the workforce strategy are still 
available; replicating this approach would require new resources to be found at 
the national level. 
The NTA approach and – so far as we can tell – those of the other UK countries 
position workforce strategies in support of overall outcomes to be achieved and 
models of care. We have noted before the interdependencies of elements that 
Improving drug treatment services in England 
 
The King’s Fund  52 
 
make up a drug treatment system, but at the risk of stating the obvious, without 
clarity about what the system is trying to achieve – such as specified outcomes 
and models of care – it will not be possible to determine with any specificity how 
many commissioners are likely to be required or what capabilities they will need. 
Interviewees highlighted to us that there is not an equivalent debate in the NHS 
about the numbers and skills of commissioners, which they ascribed to the focus 
in the NHS on monitoring outcomes and performance rather than inputs. 
We heard in interviews some descriptions of areas with an extreme lack of 
commissioning capacity, with insufficient time to develop relationships with 
providers and insufficient resources for robust needs assessment. We do not 
know how representative these descriptions are, but they indicate that some 
issues may require priority for increases in investment – developing capability 
would not be sufficient on its own.  
From the literature, the development of national standards for commissioners in 
2000 and references in guidance to variations in quality and performance 
(National Treatment Agency 2006) suggest that current concerns about 
commissioner capacity and skills are not entirely new (or, put another way, that 
the situation was not perfect in the past). However, overall, the evidence does 
not indicate that concerns are just about commissioners: most of the literature 
on workforce appears to be focused more on providers, if anything, or on the 
whole system rather than just commissioners. In interviews, we heard concerns 
about capacity in the provider workforce and the lack of a reliable pipeline to 
ensure that staffing services with the right level of expertise would continue to 
be viable. 
We have not found evaluations or other formal evidence in literature about 
whether drug treatment commissioners need specific expertise around drug 
services and addictions, or whether commissioning these services is a generic 
role that requires the same skills and knowledge as commissioners of other 
public health services. This is, however, an issue that has been raised before 
(Advisory Committee on the Misuse of Drugs 2017) and which was of great 
interest to interviewees. Interviewees (who had specialist knowledge) had clear 
opinions that specialist knowledge was necessary. In addition, there were clear 
views that specialist knowledge of information was necessary to understand drug 
treatment data and needs assessment (ie analysts). 
We have briefly considered two NHS models: the roll-out of IAPT and the 
development of commissioning support units. IAPT does not seem to offer 
relevant learning for this issue, as it concerns providers more than 
commissioners, and – unlike drug treatments – IAPT treatments are relatively 
much more standardised, and needs are relatively more consistent across 
populations, so the issue is one of scaling up rather than bespoke development 
Improving drug treatment services in England 
 
The King’s Fund  53 
 
based on local needs assessment. Commissioning support units as they exist in 
the NHS are complex because of their variability and would be excessively over-
engineered for a relatively small sector such as drug treatments. However, the 
basic principle of their approach – a national framework of principles and 
expectations, together with regional centres of advice and support – merits 
further exploration. We heard Public Health England’s regional centres described 
as centres of advice, including an example of them advising on the detail of 
contract design, including requirements and the monitoring of guidance from the 
National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE), which may offer a 
platform for further exploration. 
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• Since the 2013 reforms, there are now just two main levers for local 
authorities’ accountability – sector-led improvement and formal 
intervention by the Secretary of State – with a large gap between them. 
There is a lack of confidence that sector-led improvement is robust in 
ensuring accountability, but our research suggests it is under-used, and 
perhaps not used at all in drug services, related to a lack of central 
funding for it; doing so could be an opportunity for testing and 
evaluating the approach. 
• For public health functions, lines of accountability have become diffuse 
and complex. National datasets of public health and drug treatment 
outcomes and performance indicators are available, but they are not 
currently used for accountability. 
• More evidence is needed, but comparing drug treatment services to a 
five-point framework for types of accountability in health and care 
suggests that: 
o the consistency of focus and follow-through by scrutiny 
committees could be improved 
o it is difficult to achieve accountability through performance-based 
contracts, with a risk of over-engineering, selection bias and 
limited impact 
o management accountability is currently entirely within individual 
local authorities, and is potentially just one item on a broad 
performance dashboard – some external oversight and a specific 
focus on drug services may be needed 
o regulatory accountability is only possible for registered providers 
and not for commissioners or the system as a whole – however, 
although they do not have enforcement sanctions, whole-system 
thematic reviews by the regulator could be useful in shining a light 
on issues 
o drug treatment services may be perceived as lacking political 
impact, but our research on rough sleeping and associated health 
issues suggests that building local political commitment could 
create positive electoral accountability as a positive force for 
improvement.  
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• There is a case for considering a regional role in accountability in 
services, such as drug treatment services, which have complex local 
accountability and poor connection to national accountability. 
• There are caveats about transferring learning from the NHS to local 
authorities. However, there are examples which may offer useful 
principles for consideration – such as the arrangements for ensuring 
that funding for additional increased access to child and adolescent 
mental health services (CAMHS) is conditional on an approval process 
for local plans and routine external monitoring of performance and 
outcomes. 
• Radical changes in 2013 in England contrast with the other UK 
countries’ evolutionary approaches to drug treatment services. There is 
significant potential to learn from Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland 
as they progressively embed and mature approaches to accountability 
for outcomes, performance and quality. 
Ingredients of accountability in health and care 
What accountability ‘is’ in relation to public services, is a non-trivial question. 
There are various ways in which it can be conceptualised and defined (Maybin et 
al 2011; Leat 1988). 
Maybin et al’s (2011) five types of accountability are particularly useful for 
thinking about health and care services: 
• Scrutiny – where the account holder receives a detailed account of 
performance within a particular area for which the account giver is being 
held to account. 
• Contract – account holders (eg commissioners) will hold account givers 
(eg providers) to account for meeting the agreed objectives as defined by 
the contract. 
• Management – defined as answerability to an account holder in 
accordance with agreed performance criteria. Managerial accountability 
differs from regulation in that it may be applied ex post facto (ie 
responding to performance) as opposed to ex ante (ie defining a minimum 
standard of performance), and is usually based on a hierarchy of authority 
and control. 
• Regulation – involves the setting of ex ante standards, in which the 
account holder has clearly defined post hoc intervention powers or 
sanctions. The regulator is typically independent. These standards are 
predominantly minimum standards, rather than developmental or focused 
on quality improvement.  
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• Electoral – defined as voters holding to account a representative that they 
have elected to a particular post. 
Maybin et al suggest that these accountabilities may work in combination, so 
long as attention is given to avoiding potential overlaps, gaps and excessive 
burdens. The World Health Organization (WHO) notes that effective 
accountability – which should be constructive rather than just backward-looking 
and punitive – must be part of a wider approach to governance that connects 
with, and ensures a balance between, transparency, participation, the integrity 
of processes and policy capability (World Health Organization 2017).  
Any approach to accountability needs to be underpinned by a clear 
‘accountability map’, so that different actors know and understand what they are 
being held to account for, how and by whom. Important characteristics for a 
system of accountability to be effective include: 
• a clear goal or goals (which may be around service delivery, or outcomes 
creation) that are the purpose and goal of the system 
• an agreed understanding of the services required (if goals are primarily 
service focused) or the production function for outcomes (if goals are 
primarily outcomes focused) 
• clarity over responsibility for service delivery or outcomes (or both as 
relevant) 
• clear definitions of performance and transparency 
• a balance of penalties for poor performance and incentives to improve, in 
terms of transparency, financial or other matters 
• appropriate funding for expected goals to be delivered 
• perhaps most importantly, the ability to respond to accountability, to 
improve delivery or outcomes.  
When considering these characteristics from WHO in the context of drug 
treatment services in England, it is noticeable that their goal and purpose have 
changed over time – including, for example, at different times, priority to harm 
reduction, opioids and crime reduction, abstinence and journeys to recovery. The 
current situation allows for different local authority areas to define different 
purposes and goals, which WHO’s framework suggests would make national 
accountability problematic. Performance towards the broad goal of ‘recovery’ is 
also likely to be particularly difficult to measure, and especially to measure 
consistently, without some degree of nationally required indicators. 
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What are the design options for accountability in complex public 
service systems?  
Gore et al (2020) set out a simple framework of public service accountability. In 
particular, in health and care systems, there is ‘vertical accountability’ and 
‘horizontal accountability’. The former refers to the accountability relationships 
between national organisations and decision bodies, through regional bodies, 
and into local bodies. The latter refers to how accountabilities relate within any 
tier, for example between government departments or local partnerships. These 
horizontal accountabilities are likely to differ by the degree of interdependence 
between services.  
Figure 2 places various public services on this ‘accountability map’. Drug 
services, summarised as a whole, are likely to sit at the bottom right – services 
that are primarily locally delivered and commissioned with high interdependence. 
However, elements of drug services commissioning sit at various points on the 
map – there are national, through regional and local roles and some services are 
more interdependent than others.  
Figure 2: Accountability in complex public services 
Accountability and local government 
Local government as a whole 
The Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) has set 
out an accountability framework between it, its arm’s-length bodies and local 
government in some detail (Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local 
Government 2020b).  
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MHCLG only has two main levers for local authorities’ accountability: sector-led 
improvement (structured peer-to-peer support arranged under the auspices of 
the Local Government Association; see Local Government Association undated) 
and the extreme circumstances where the Secretary of State intervenes. There 
is a large gap between these.  
One way of helping to fill this gap could be the development of local public 
accounts committees, first proposed by the Centre for Governance and Scrutiny, 
which argued that since 2013, ‘accountability arrangements are not strong 
enough for the increasingly complex landscape that characterises public service 
delivery in many localities’ (Centre for Governance and Scrutiny 2018). The 
Centre for Governance and Scrutiny believes that each local place requires its 
own local public accounts committee to makes sense of the complex 
accountabilities that exist horizontally and vertically to central government 
departments and arm’s-length bodies. It argues that these bodies need 
oversight over all public expenditure in the local area, and this would provide 
assurance to central government that funding and the freedom to spend it in 
accordance with locally agreed plans can safely be devolved further. 
MHCLG has set up a Local Authority Governance and Accountability Framework 
Review Panel (Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government 
undated), with terms of reference to assess how well the existing accountability 
system for MHCLG and its delivery chain are working as a whole. This met five 
times in the year to September 2020 and a review of the minutes shows the 
following areas of concern. 
• There is a lack of data and metrics available consistently between services 
and across the country to inform governance. This drew on a report from 
the National Audit Office on local authority governance (National Audit 
Office 2019). 
• The local audit market is weak; and there has been a missed opportunity 
to link local government and NHS audit. 
• The current governance system has been in place since 1974 and has not 
adapted to new circumstances, including the emergence of combined 
authorities and the emerging role of mayors. 
• There is a gap in the accountability system between national and local – 
to which local public accounts committees might be a solution. 
The National Audit Office report referred to above noted some significant aspects 
of the accountability system that require improvement, such as: 
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The Department lacks the evidence base to assess rigorously whether 
governance issues are system-wide and this reduces the level of 
confidence it can have in the operation of the system… The Department is 
able to intervene both formally and informally in authorities where it has 
concerns about governance arrangements, but the process of engagement 
short of statutory intervention is not transparent. The Department told us 
that there was no fixed process for advising the Secretary of State about 
the use of formal intervention powers. 
(National Audit Office 2019, pp 11–12) 
Buck (2020) has questioned whether sector-led improvement is enough on its 
own to secure improvement, in the context of the public health system that sits 
within the local government accountability framework, concluding that: 
[T]ransparency on its own is not enough to ensure improvement. In 2010, 
the incoming Coalition government abolished the National Indicator Set, 
the mechanisms behind it (such as Local Area Agreements) and the Audit 
Commission (whose role was to oversee local government performance). 
Funding was also cut for the Improvement and Development Agency for 
local government. This was a significant loss and Public Health England 
does not have a remit to police what local authorities choose to do, and 
beyond providing support and tools, intervenes only in ill-defined, 
exceptional circumstances. Into this gap, the main way that local 
government seeks to improve is through peer-to-peer improvement. 
(Buck 2020, p 48) 
This is not to argue with the fact that sector-led improvement is highly thought 
of by those who have gone through it, and it is a serious and intense process. 
For example, 94 per cent of leaders and 98 per cent of chief executives say 
support from the Local Government Association has a positive impact on their 
authority and the Local Government Association supported 129 peer challenges 
in 2019–20 (Local Government Association 2020). 
Sector-led improvement is evolving over time and there are different models in 
use, including at local and regional levels. The Local Government Association and 
the Association of Directors of Public Health both publish very helpful summaries 
and case studies (Local Government Association and Association of Directors of 
Public Health 2018). However, given that some of the wider accountability and 
support mechanisms were removed by the 2010 reforms, there are valid 
questions to ask about whether sector-led improvement, and its key features, is 
enough on its own. 
In particular, sector-led improvement is voluntary, so there is self-selection in its 
use and it asks a lot of those involved. The act of seeking to be involved in 
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sector-led improvement is therefore a signal in itself of the desire to improve. 
The deeper question is what is happening in those areas that have not engaged 
with support for improvement in their public health services and outcomes? It is 
much less clear what happens when things go wrong in local government public 
health (as it was when it was in the NHS), and there is a lack of clarity over how 
that is actually defined. For example, if a key indicator (perhaps life expectancy) 
or a suite of Public Health Outcomes Framework (PHOF) indicators drop 
consistently and significantly in an area compared with experience in similar 
areas (in terms of population characteristics), what does this mean, would that 
be seen as failure, and if so, who’s failure? What would be done, if anything? 
More generally, the Public Accounts Committee has been concerned about local 
authority governance at a time of increasing financial stress (National Audit 
Office 2019). 
Public health functions 
The King’s Fund reviewed the 2013 public health reforms in an independent 
assessment, commissioned by the Local Government Association (Buck 2020). 
The overall assessment concluded that public health functions were in the right 
place, but progress had been severely hampered by cuts to the central 
government grant for public health, and the wider cuts that local government 
has been subjected too. 
The King’s Fund review found that, in general, accountability is highly complex. 
The problem is not that there is no accountability, it is that it is tangled and it is 
unclear how the various forms of accountability work together. Figure 3 is a 
stylised summary of how these accountabilities currently work. 
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Figure 3 Key accountability frameworks and relationships ‘in and 
around’ the public health system, England  
Source: Buck et al 2018 
There is a National Drug Treatment Monitoring System (NDTMS) dataset, but it 
is not used for the external performance management of local authorities. It is in 
fact not clear that it would currently be possible to link NDTMS data to different 
service models or commissioning arrangements so as to identify how they may 
be associated with outcomes. There is also a dashboard of wider comparative 
indicators – the Public Health Outcomes Framework (PHOF) – but Public Health 
England makes clear that its purpose is not accountability: ‘The Public Health 
Outcomes Framework is not a performance management tool for local 
authorities. PHOF data will enable local authorities to benchmark and compare 
their own outcomes with other local authorities’ (Public Health England 2013). 
We have looked into how sector-led improvement has developed in public health 
functions. Searching for sector-led improvement experiences in drug services 
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does not find any hits. This may be because sector-led improvement is funded 
through a memorandum of understanding between MHCLG and the Local 
Government Association, and there has not been funding specifically through the 
memorandum, or directly from the Department of Health and Social Care, for 
sector-led improvement in drug services. This requires further investigation.  
However, the Department of Health and Social Care has recently commissioned 
the Local Government Association to deliver suicide prevention sector-led 
improvement work, child obesity trailblazers and work on ICSs. Most recently 
(June 2020), the Local Government Association has co-funded the Substance 
Misuse Commissioners Network (hosted by the Association of Directors of Public 
Health) to provide a forum for commissioners to come together to discuss the 
challenges they face and to support each other. 
Drug treatment services 
Overall, the 2013 reforms created accountability challenges for drug treatment 
and other services, so much so that Checkland et al (2013) questioned whether 
the twin aspirations of increased autonomy and increased accountability could be 
realised in practice.  
Below, we have considered how drug treatment services relate to the five-point 
accountability framework developed by Maybin et al (2011). 
Scrutiny 
Interviewees told us that local government oversight and scrutiny committees 
can scrutinise drug treatment services and there have been instances when they 
have done so. There is a need to collate further evidence about the role of these 
committees and their impact with regard to drug treatment, as they clearly have 
potential to be a key part of an effective accountability system. The perception 
of those we spoke to appeared to be that oversight and scrutiny committees 
have rarely engaged with drug treatment and are not well placed to ensure any 
concerns are followed through. 
Contract accountability 
The literature available in this area relates to performance contracting and 
Payment by Results. Again, there is a need for further research in this area. 
Overall, conclusions appear to be that contract assurance through payment for 
performance mechanisms is problematic. One study from the United States 
found that: 
The economics literature notes that when patient outcomes are strongly 
influenced by factors beyond provider control and when risk adjustment 
performs poorly, pay-for-outcomes will increase provider financial risk… 
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There are special challenges in applying pay-for-outcomes to Substance 
Use Disorder treatment, not all of which could be overcome by developing 
better measures. 
(Hodgkin et al 2020) 
A study in England concluded that: 
This ‘Payment by Results’ scheme was not associated with improvements 
for most drug recovery outcomes. Despite being a prime marker of 
recovery with a high payment tariff, comparative rates of successful 
completion of treatment without re-presentation worsened within the 
scheme... This finding is consistent with evidence from the payment for 
performance (P4P) evidence base, which has generally only shown 
improvements in indicators of processes to be weakly linked to the 
introduction of P4P. 
(Jones et al 2018) 
Other studies suggest that payment for performance contracting can increase 
capacity utilisation (in systems with spare capacity) (McLellan et al. 2008) but 
also lead to selection bias, ie providers treating less severe patients to improve 
measured outcomes (Shen 2003). 
Management accountability 
Interviewees described to us a system of management accountability that was 
within local authorities (in contrast to the NHS, for example, which has a 
hierarchy of local systems reporting up to regional and national bodies). We 
heard descriptions of local systems that were held to account against a very 
small number of indicators on a wider public health dashboard. Some of the 
interviewees (who were specialists from highly performing areas) regarded this 
as overly simplistic but an inevitability if drug services were monitored within the 
wide generic range of local authority responsibilities rather than through a 
bespoke system. 
In complex systems with dispersed accountability relationships (such as drug 
treatment services, which are all accountable to different local authorities), and 
in complex accountability relationships (such as drug treatment services, which 
often form a complex ‘pathway’ with multiple interdependencies, and a wide 
range of factors that can influence their performance), Checkland et al (2018) 
make a case for stronger regional supervision: 
Overall, our study suggests that decentralisation requires some degree of 
regional co-ordination and oversight by an organisation able to ‘hold the ring’ 
and support the myriad of local bodies that must work together to deliver 
increasingly complicated services in a resource-constrained environment. 
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There is currently little available research that explores the role of meso-level 
organisations in health systems. 
(Checkland et al 2018)  
Regulation 
The Independent Review of Drugs has identified that although the Care Quality 
Commission regulates individual providers, there is no external regulation of 
drug treatment commissioners (Black 2020). This is a result of the Care Quality 
Commission’s statutory remit. The independent review also identified that a 
large part of the drug treatment workforce is not subject to any professional 
regulation. 
The Care Quality Commission is able to conduct thematic reviews and to do so 
on a ‘whole system’ basis (with the consent of the relevant Secretaries of State), 
as it has recently done for services for older people and its predecessor body the 
Healthcare Commission did for the commissioning of drug treatment services 
(Care Quality Commission 2018; Commission for Healthcare Audit and 
Inspection 2008). These reviews do not have enforcement powers but can shine 
a spotlight on different aspects of the health and care system. 
Electoral accountability 
We did not identify any examples of electoral accountability. Some interviewees 
we spoke to opined that drug treatment services had low political impact and so 
electoral accountability would be weak. However, in previous research we have 
found that where there was public concern about rough sleeping and associated 
issues including drug use, it could be possible to mobilise political commitment – 
including accountability if there was no improvement – and that this could make 
an important difference (Cream et al. 2020). 
What can we learn from accountability arrangements in the NHS? 
Local authorities and the NHS have very different structures and accountability 
arrangements and learning between them is likely to be at the level of principles 
rather than directly applicable approaches. For example, much of the work 
associated with Checkland et al referred to above is based on long-term studies 
of the accountability of primary care, which has resonance with drug services.  
We have considered mental health support teams as an example that may 
illustrate some of those principles. Interviewees identified mental health support 
teams as having some parallels to the situation of drug treatment services 
insofar as they have been set up as a key way in which the NHS is seeking to 
increase funding for CAMHS and to increase partnership working, as part of a 
strategy to reverse under-investment after years of mounting concern about 
access to effective services (NHS England 2019). 
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Funding for mental health support teams is conditional on receipt of a plan that 
reflects national guidance, including cross-sector partnership, adherence to 
evidence-based standards and service user involvement. Some areas have been 
asked to improve and re-submit plans in order for funding to be unlocked. We 
were told in interviews that the principle of funding being conditional on the 
approval of plans was fundamental. Furthermore, areas are required to provide 
regular data returns. Again, interviewees told us that it was a firm principle that 
funding was linked to accountability for performance and outcomes.  
What can we learn from accountability for drug services in other UK 
nations? 
The English system can learn from how accountability works for drug services in 
the other UK nations (see the case studies in section 4). 
In general, the other nations tend to have more integrated approaches to drug 
services and accountability for them through boards that cover multiple services 
and partners. 
 
Each country also offers learning on specific aspects of accountability. For 
example, the regional approach adopted in Wales has useful learning about how 
to simplify accountability across multiple partners and sectors. Northern 
Ireland’s review of its strategy includes designing cross-ministerial accountability 
and further developing the use of outcomes frameworks. Scotland meanwhile is 
developing metrics for accountability and has implemented quality standards. 
The Scottish government report Quality principles: standard expectations of care 
and support in drug and alcohol services (Scottish Government 2014) was broad 
reaching and set out an aspirational approach to service delivery at an 
organisational level. Two years after the quality principles were published, the 
Scottish government commissioned the Care Inspectorate to lead an evaluation, 
consisting of a programme of validated self-assessment, to determine how well 
the principles had been embedded, and assess their impact on supporting 
alcohol and drugs partnerships to assist their clients. In November 2016, each of 
these partnerships received individual reports detailing strengths and 
recommendations, which were developed into action plans. 
As a result, a commitment was made in the ‘Rights, Respect and Recovery 
Strategy’ (Scottish Government 2018) to develop a new quality assurance and 
improvement framework. This is being designed to measure specific standards 
for service delivery through objective success indicators to ensure that services 
are delivered to required benchmarks. These can be applied at a service level or 
across a number of services as required.  
The Welsh government has devolved powers for policies concerning health, 
education, housing and social care. The Substance Misuse National Partnership 
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Board guides and monitors progress of the Welsh Substance Misuse Delivery 
Plan 2019–22 (Welsh Government 2019). Prisons, policing and criminal justice 
are not devolved but close joint working is supported by a National Policing 
Board. 
The Department of Health in Northern Ireland is responsible for leading and co-
ordinating action on Northern Ireland’s substance use strategy. The current 
strategy – the New Strategic Direction for Alcohol & Drugs Phase 2 (Northern 
Ireland Department of Health undated) – has been in place since 2012, and a 
new strategy is in development and out for consultation. 
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4 Case studies 
Child and adolescent mental health services (CAMHS): 
provider collaboratives 
Historical underinvestment and cuts to funding have impacted on access to 
mental health services and the quality of care (The King’s Fund 2019). Any 
increases in funding have often been attached to individual programmes, 
fragmenting services and leaving core services without the investment they 
need.  
Fragmented commissioning 
There have been longstanding problems with NHS England’s specialised 
commissioning for mental health; it covers a wide range of services but is not 
thought to be giving value for money. Two of the biggest areas of spending are 
adult secure services and tier 3 and tier 4 children and young people’s services. 
In both cases, they are part of wider care pathways that are commissioned 
locally by clinical commissioning groups (CCGs). This split in the commissioning 
responsibilities of NHS England and CCGs means there is potential for ‘gaming’ 
and a lack of incentive for CCGs to invest in local services. 
The Five year forward view for mental health proposed two ‘new care models’ for 
adult secure services and tier 3 and tier 4 children and young people’s mental 
health services (The Mental Health Taskforce 2016). The idea was that NHS 
England would hand the current budget allocated for specialised commissioning 
of these areas to local provider partnerships across six regions in the first 
instance (Gammie 2016). The process involved providers applying and being 
selected.  
The incentive was that the partnership would retain any expenditure gains to 
invest in improving patient pathways, including in the community. The total 
budget of the programme across two waves (covering 17 ‘sites’ in total across 
the two waves) is approximately £650 million. The objectives are admissions 
avoidance, reducing lengths of hospital stay and the repatriation of patients from 
out-of-area placements. The second wave of the programme was announced in 
2017 (Gammie 2017). 
Early evaluation findings 
It is very early days in the New Care Model programme. Some of the early 
learning indicates there was some positive impact on joint working. For example, 
in the South West region (working together on adult secure services), 
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partnership working is described as a success. Before the programme the 
providers in the region had the same goal but were working individually, often 
thinking in terms of their county rather than the South West as a whole. The 
providers developed a shared vision, clinical model and business model, which 
senior clinicians and leaders across the South West Regional Secure Services 
Partnership support. ‘Crucially, this has led to a culture shift: we all now see 
ourselves as part of a whole region and are planning and supporting each other 
accordingly, and in real time’ (Forbes and Fee 2018).  
In South London, whereas previously there had been competition for funding or 
contracts, the three trusts have developed a more collaborative approach to 
joint pathways, processes and services.  
The evaluation report notes some positive progress in terms of key outcomes 
such as admissions to inpatient services and treating people closer to home 
(Niche Health and Social Care Consulting 2019). 
In terms of joint working, the evaluation found: 
• ‘a strong sense’ that the New Care Model programme has created a 
greater willingness for organisations that had previously seen each other 
as competitors to work together as partners in the process of service 
improvement 
• a sense of increased ownership and empowerment  
• a clear aspiration (across most stakeholders) for the New Care Model 
programme to be taken forward into a more fully delegated process of 
local commissioning.  
The five main factors deemed to have facilitated the implementation of the New 
Care Model pilot are (Niche Health and Social Care Consulting 2019, p 14): 
• a clear ambition to do something different locally, not simply to take on 
additional responsibility with no clear vision and purpose in mind – indeed, 
some sites are ambitious to move beyond the current New Care Model 
arrangement to a much more integrated process of recommissioning and 
service reconfiguration 
• strong relationships of trust between both local partners, and between 
those partners and regional NHS England staff 
• clear governance and leadership, driven at a senior level by both 
managers and clinicians 
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• strong financial management, including clear agreements as to the 
distribution of costs, savings and investment 
• effective processes for managing each part of the flow through the patient 
pathway – admission, case management and discharge – with a 
willingness to constructively challenge clinical custom and practice.  
However, it is important to note that the evaluation cannot attribute any of the 
changes to the New Care Model programme alone. According to stakeholders 
interviewed as part of the evaluation, this approach to commissioning is, at best, 
a ‘transitional’ approach and not one that is sustainable in the longer term.  
The Troubled Families programme 
The Troubled Families programme is an example of a whole-system approach to 
addressing families experiencing disadvantage, with a particular focus on 
‘worklessness’. It has so far run in two phases (2011 to 2015 and 2015 to 2020) 
and funding was confirmed into 2021 in the 2020 spending review. While both 
phases used a Payment by Results mechanism to incentivise local authorities to 
support eligible families, the second phase developed from the first phase 
following a critical evaluation, which highlighted concerns about the lack of 
evidence of impact on the programme’s intended outcomes (Day et al. 2016). 
While funding per family was reduced in the second phase, eligibility criteria 
were widened to capture more families needing support, and local authorities 
were required to show that they had actively worked with families to claim the 
financial incentive. The evaluation methodology for phase 2 was also altered and 
included regular reporting throughout the programme, 60 outcome indicators for 
the long-term tracking of outcomes and an independent advisory group who 
supported and scrutinised the evaluation (Loft 2020). Three potential insights 
from this work are of relevance to the commissioning of drug treatment services. 
• The length of the funding period was viewed positively and as a key 
aspect of enabling local authorities to embed new ways of working across 
their local systems (Economy and Gong 2017). 
• The programme had a national set of indicators, but allowed individual 
local authorities to contextualise these through their local outcome plans. 
While some local authorities still found this too restrictive (Economy and 
Gong 2017), the flexibility it did offer could be enabling, with an example 
in the evaluation where a local area ensured its local outcome plan ‘was 
aligned with changing local needs over and above national priorities for 
the programme’ (Ipsos MORI 2019, p15). Having national aims 
translatable to a local level is positive but there is a need to ensure this 
flexibility extends to areas being able to measure meaningful outcomes. 
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• According to the programme evaluation (Ministry of Housing, Communities 
and Local Government 2019) and one external review (Economy and 
Gong 2017), this is an example of a programme where the Payment by 
Results mechanism appeared to incentivise local authorities to improve 
how they measured outcomes, shared data and facilitated multi-agency 
collaborative working. In addition, in 2018, a small number of local 
authorities that had seen positive results were allowed, following a 
competitive bidding process, to transfer to a system of ‘Earned 
Autonomy’, where although outcomes are still tracked and reported, all 
the financial support is provided upfront to enable larger investment in 
their local systems (Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local 
Government 2018). The evaluation reported that local authorities that 
transferred to this model viewed it positively, allowing them a more 
meaningful focus on local outcomes (Ipsos MORI 2019). 
Sexual health services 
Sexual health services are a major component of the public health grant. Like 
drug and alcohol services, demand has increased in recent years while funding 
has been cut; re-procurement exercises have stimulated controversial service 
reconfigurations and affected staff morale; and a change to commissioning 
responsibilities following the Health and Social Care Act 2012 fragmented 
planning arrangements, and led to some patients experiencing a disjointed 
service (Robertson et al. 2017). 
The experience of sexual health services provides several insights relevant to 
drug services. However, in most cases, these are issues that sexual health 
services are still struggling with and therefore the case study does not provide a 
clear model that can be transposed to drug services. 
A legal mandate  
There is a legal mandate that requires local authorities to provide a 
comprehensive, open-access sexually transmitted infection (STI) testing and 
treatment service for their local population. This may have provided some 
protection for the STI testing and treatment spend. Table 7 shows that other 
non-mandated sexual health services have experienced much deeper cuts: there 
has been a 38 per cent real-terms reduction in spending on (non-mandated) 
prevention, promotion and advice services since 2016/17, compared with a 12 
per cent reduction in STI testing and treatment spend. However, there are a 
range of other factors that might explain this difference. One example is that 
prevention and promotion services are often provided by small charities on 
short-term contracts that are more easily terminated than the big NHS contracts 
(Robertson et al. 2017). We cannot tell from the data how much protection a 
legal mandate provides – the services have still experienced significant cuts. 
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To fulfil the legal mandate, commissioners are required to ensure a service is in 
place and to report on their spend. There are no specific requirements about the 
quality or extent of that service beyond it being ‘open and comprehensive’. We 
know from interviews with sexual health commissioners conducted in 2016/7 
that some were seeking legal advice on the definition of a ‘comprehensive open 
access service’ to help them understand what changes could be made to services 
within the law. This shows that the precise wording of a mandate will affect the 
actions commissioners take to fulfil it. 
Table 7: Local authority net expenditure on sexual health and substance 
misuse services, 2016/7–2019/20 











Sexual health services – total 549.03 -10.18 -15.18 
STI testing and treatment 
(prescribed functions) 335.15 -6.98 -12.15 
Contraception (prescribed functions) 163.46 -6.33 -11.54 
Promotion, prevention and advice 
(non-prescribed functions) 50.42 -34.05 -37.72 
Substance misuse – total 663.38 -14.46 -21.2 
Treatment for drug misuse in adults 348.27 -14.73 -19.48 
Treatment for alcohol misuse in 
adults 171.15 -6.625 -11.82 
Preventing and reducing harm from 
drug misuse in adults 63.56 -11.95 -16.84 
Preventing and reducing harm from 
alcohol misuse in adults 41.91 7.92 1.91 
Specialist drug and alcohol misuse 
services for children and young 
people 38.49 -31.92 -35.71 
* 2019/20 data is provisional.  
** Figures in real terms were calculated in 2019/20 prices using June 2020 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) deflators (available at: 
www.gov.uk/government/statistics/gdp-deflators-at-market-prices-and-money-
gdp-june-2020-quarterly-national-accounts). 
Source: Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government 2020b; 
Department for Communities and Local Government 2017 
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Fragmented commissioning arrangements 
In 2013, responsibility for commissioning sexual and reproductive health 
services was split between CCGs, NHS England and local authorities. As with 
drug services, a number of major reports from parliamentary committees and 
other organisations have highlighted the impact this has had on planning and 
incentives, leading some patients to experience a disjointed service as they 
move between services commissioned by different organisations (Robertson et al 
2017; House of Commons Health Select Committee 2016; APPG 2015). 
There is no single approach that has been taken to improving joint working. NHS 
England has asked CCGs to work more closely with local authorities on sexual 
health commissioning – but the nature of this collaboration has been left to local 
areas (Department of Health and Social Care 2019). The collaborative 
approaches developed by local areas include things like the following (Local 
Government Association 2019; Local Government Association and Medical 
Foundation for HIV and Sexual Health 2015). 
• Commissioning a range of services via a single contract. For 
example, in Teeside, the four councils, two CCGs and NHS England are 
partners on a single contract for sexual health services with a prime 
provider. A collaborative commissioning agreement between the seven 
partners underpins this, which sets out how they will work together to 
manage the contract. They say the new contract has improved access, 
generated savings and is highly rated by users and that it has enabled 
them to focus on prevention and addressing health inequalities. 
• Delegating responsibilities to a lead commissioner. In Lambeth, 
Southwark and Lewisham, the local authority manages abortion service 
contracts on behalf of the three local CCGs, allowing them to develop a 
joined-up pathway for reproductive services and to focus on things like 
reducing unwanted pregnancies and addressing inequalities. 
There is no robust evaluation data on the impact of these arrangements. As is 
the case with most analyses of joint commissioning arrangements, including 
many of those focused on drug services (Local Government Association 2018), 
they tend to describe the arrangements and the barriers and enablers to 
establishing them along with interviewee reports on impact. It is very difficult to 
generate robust evaluation data on this type of commissioning approach due to 
difficulties with attribution. 
The information we have about barriers and enablers to this type of joint 
working points to the need to focus on local context and the conditions in which 
joint working is being pursued. A Public Health England review of joint sexual 
health commissioning pilots in four areas (Public Health England 2020) identified 
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the following factors that must be in place to support effective joint 
commissioning: 
• clarity on the scope of the collaborative arrangements 
• clarity on, and understanding of, decision-making processes in each 
organisation 
• sufficient time to build local relationships and procure together 
• recognition of the importance of starting small and tackling areas of work 
that are of a manageable size. 
Re-procurement 
Commissioners and providers have reported issues with the process for 
procuring sexual health services, which has involved retendering contracts 
through competitive procurement. While there are reports of positive changes 
implemented through successful tendering exercises, commissioners and 
providers have highlighted the difficulties frequent retendering brings, including 
disruption to services when new tenders are awarded, difficulty retaining the 
best staff and provoking innovation within an unstable environment, and the 
time spent preparing tender bids (APPG 2015; BASHH 2013). This shows that 
the issues reported with tendering exercises in drug services are not unique. 
They affect other public health services, and other areas of NHS procurement, 
like community services. Commissioners of sexual health services identified 
longer commissioning cycles and avoiding re-procurement where there is a clear 
benefit of staying with the incumbent as potential solutions (Local Government 
Association 2019). 
The National Treatment Agency 
The National Treatment Agency (NTA) existed from 2001 to 2013 and many still 
working in the drugs sector hold it in high regard (Department of Health and 
Social Care undated), with calls for a return to its model of working. However, 
NHS structures have changed significantly since the NTA was disbanded and it is 
therefore unclear how an NTA model would be possible to replicate in the 2020s. 
What it does offer is insights into strengthening accountability for drug services 
in England.  
The NTA developed a four-tier model of services (National Treatment Agency 
2006), together with investment in the drugs workforce and training, and 
advocacy to government and others, to support its approach. 
It had both vertical and horizontal lines of accountability. Vertically, NTA was 
accountable to both Department of Health and Home Office ministers and given 
responsibility for overseeing spending of the pooled treatment budget from the 
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two departments. In turn, it held local drug partnerships (drug action teams) to 
account through nine regional NTA teams scrutinising their yearly annual 
commissioning plans (Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs 2017). 
Horizontally, at the local level, drug action teams had multiple partners – health, 
police, probation and local authority senior leaders – who had to jointly agree 
and sign off their strategic plans. A 2008 review from the Healthcare 
Commission (Commission for Healthcare Audit and Inspection 2008, p 5) found 
that these local commissioning partnerships and the NTA had ‘developed strong 
performance management structures for drug treatment’ and regional teams 
were holding quarterly reviews with all local drug partnerships to monitor 
performance. 
This model was widely regarded as successful and represents significantly 
stronger lines of accountability than current arrangements. However, it also 
experienced some criticism for taking an overly centralised approach without 
enough recognition of local needs (House of Commons Health and Social Care 
Committee 2019; McGrail 2014) and an overly bureaucratic approach (Centre for 
Social Justice 2019; Valios 2004). Any new accountability arrangements will 
need to tread a fine line between local autonomy and national control. 
Other UK nations 
Scotland 
In Scotland, integration authorities have a statutory responsibility to oversee the 
delivery of health and social care services at the local level. Integration 
authorities are responsible for the governance, planning and resourcing of social 
care, primary and community health care and unscheduled hospital care for 
adults. Some areas have also delegated additional services further to those that 
are required in statute, including children’s services, social work, criminal justice 
services and all acute hospital services. Integration authorities manage the 
budget for providing all integrated services. 
Alcohol and drug services for adults are delegated to integration authorities 
across all of Scotland and all integration authorities are responsible for the 
planning and commissioning of drug and alcohol treatment and support services 
for adults, alongside other adult health and social care services. 
Alcohol and drugs partnerships are responsible for developing and implementing 
a strategic plan to address alcohol and drug harms. In many areas of Scotland, 
they are responsible for the commissioning of adult treatment services, 
children’s services, housing and community justice services and this is done 
through local governance arrangements. 
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The Scottish government’s report Quality principles: standard expectations of 
care and support in drug and alcohol services (Scottish Government 2014) was 
broad reaching and set out an aspirational approach to service delivery at an 
organisational level. Two years after the quality principles were published, the 
Scottish government commissioned the Care Inspectorate to lead an evaluation, 
consisting of a programme of validated self-assessment, to determine how well 
the principles had been embedded, and assess their impact on supporting 
mental health support teams to assist their clients. In November 2016, each of 
these teams received individual reports detailing strengths and 
recommendations, which were developed into action plans. 
However, since this time, Scotland has seen some important changes to the 
context and service delivery, namely:  
• a significant increase in drug deaths 
• a new strategy with a clear focus on harm reduction for both alcohol and 
drug problems 
• more integrated approaches to services involving a range of organisations 
• the emergence of a cohort of people who are at a greater risk of drug 
deaths whose needs are not being met by existing services. 
As a result, a commitment was made in the ‘Rights, Respect and Recovery 
Strategy’ (Scottish Government 2018) to develop a new quality assurance and 
improvement framework. This is being designed to measure specific standards 
for service delivery through objective success indicators to ensure that services 
are delivered to required benchmarks. These can be applied at a service level or 
across a number of services as required.  
Wales 
The Welsh government has devolved powers for policies concerning health, 
education, housing and social care. The Substance Misuse National Partnership 
Board guides and monitors progress of the Welsh Substance Misuse Delivery 
Plan 2019–22 (Welsh Government 2019). Prisons, policing and criminal justice 
are not devolved but close joint working is supported by a National Policing 
Board. 
Area planning boards are responsible for the monitoring and delivery of 
commissioned services and are accountable in turn to the Welsh government. 
These boards operate on a regional basis, which is coterminous with health 
board boundaries, and they bring together a range of senior partners from their 
area, including representation from all local authorities, health, criminal justice, 
the police, including police and crime commissioners, and the third sector. They 
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are chaired by a senior leader (generally a director of public health or deputy 
chief executive of a local authority) and all are required to ensure that the 
experiences of service users are represented.  
The decision to establish area planning boards has reduced partnership 
complexity as previously responsibility for commissioned services was with 22 
community safety partnerships; these duties are now discharged via the area 
planning boards. An evaluation of the previous strategy, published in 2018, 
noted that area planning boards have significantly improved partnership 
working. By commissioning services at a regional level, economies of scale have 
been achieved as well as reductions in variance of support (Healthcare 
Inspectorate Wales and Care Inspectorate Wales 2018). 
The partnership landscape in Wales remains complex and care has to be taken 
to ensure effective cross-partnership working and governance at the regional 
level. In Wales, criminal justice services for substance misuse are commissioned 
via the Office of Police and Crime Commissioners (OPCC). While there is good 
join-up in many areas, this undoubtedly creates both commissioning and 
operational difficulties. Area planning boards are voluntary partnerships, which 
can affect their influence, and services are commissioned by a local authority in 
each region acting as banker on behalf of the area planning board. Some cover 
large areas, for example North Wales, and with up to six local authorities to 
work with, which may have competing pressures, this can create some 
complexity. Given the split of area planning board and health board funding, 
joint working in some areas could be improved, although area planning boards 
have to approve health board spending plans. A number of area planning boards 
that are currently recommissioning services are seeking to improve this.  
Northern Ireland 
The Department of Health in Northern Ireland is responsible for leading and co-
ordinating action on Northern Ireland’s new Substance Use Strategy. The current 
strategy – the New Strategic Direction for Alcohol & Drugs Phase 2 (Northern 
Ireland Department of Health undated) – has been in place since 2012, and the 
new strategy is in development and out for consultation. 
Drug and alcohol co-ordination teams, which operate in each of the legacy 
Health and Social Service Board areas, develop local action plans. They are 
made up of statutory and community agencies with an interest in addressing, or 
a need to address, drug and alcohol issues in their health trust area. There is a 
drug and alcohol co-ordination team for each health trust area in Northern 
Ireland. The action plans match and reflect New Strategic Direction priorities, 
and support the implementation of the New Strategic Direction at the local level. 
In order to deliver on these local action plans, the Public Health Agency tenders 
for the services they require in their respective areas, enabling all organisations 
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to bid to provide these services. The Public Health Agency has established local 
delivery structures to oversee the implementation of the local action plans. 
Northern Ireland’s health and care structures are currently in flux, so the 
situation with regard to future accountability is current unclear. Proposed actions 
outlined in Northern Ireland’s proposed new Substance Use Strategy (called 
‘Making Life Better – preventing harm and empowering recovery’) include: 
developing or amending current monitoring mechanisms to ensure these are 
robust and fit for purpose; and for the Health and Social Care Board to develop 
an outcomes framework for all tier 3 and tier 4 services to monitor the impact 
and effectiveness of these services. Tier 1 and 2 services commissioned by the 
Public Health Agency will continue to be required to complete the Impact 
Measurement Tool (Department of Health 2020). The Department of Health will 
publish regular update reports on the implementation of the strategy, outlining 
progress against its outcomes, indicators and actions. This will include 
information on numbers in treatment and waiting for treatment, rates of alcohol- 
and/or drug-related hospital admissions, and outcomes for those in treatment. 
A review of the New Strategic Direction (Phase 2) in 2018 found greater 
alignment between the strategic and operational elements, along with greater 
integration across the strategic agendas of other government departments 
should feature in any future strategy (Institute of Public Health in Ireland 2018). 
Also, by placing focus on acute service provision issues, more structured 
opportunities may have been missed for evidence-informed future planning. The 
review of the current strategy was incorporated into the development of the new 
Substance Use Strategy. This focuses on the importance of seeing substance use 
within the wider approach to improving health and addressing health 
inequalities. It proposes that the Cross-Departmental Ministerial Committee on 
Public Health, which oversees the delivery of the Making Life Better strategic 
framework at the executive level, provides the overall ministerial governance for 
this framework.   
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5 The development of 
integrated care systems: 
what are the implications for 
drug services? 
Key points 
• The NHS is moving away from using competition as a tool for 
improvement and is firmly focused on collaboration as the best route to 
fulfilling the health and care needs of local populations. Integrated care 
systems (ICSs) are partnerships that bring together providers and 
commissioners of the NHS, local authorities and other local partners in a 
geographical area, to collectively plan and integrate care to meet the 
needs of their population. 
• Given the focus of ICSs is integrating care across complex system 
boundaries, for patients with complex needs, it is important that drug 
treatment services align with commissioning and accountability in ICSs 
and vice versa. 
• ICSs have been developing at different rates in different parts of 
England, and are expected to cover all of England by April 2021 (there 
will be around 44). Significant change is planned for 2021 and 2022 and 
is outlined in plans published at the end of November 2020. This 
includes stronger, but locally flexible, governance and accountability – 
bringing in wider partners including local government and the voluntary 
sector. It also includes proposals to formalise ICSs in legislation by April 
2022. 
• The emerging partnership structures being created through ICSs might 
be an effective place to consider situating any new accountability 
mechanisms being developed. However, there is a big question about 
scale and the appropriate footprint of a regional accountability role for 
drug services (as well as the formal powers) and whether that matches 
ICSs or other footprints. This is an open question, but ICSs are 
subregional structures in the NHS that are being formed and this is a 
factor to be taken into account in any regional new structure that 
supports commissioning and accountability around drug services. 
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• As part of the plans for the future of ICSs, all NHS providers will join 
provider collaboratives. Well-designed provider collaboratives are the 
mirror of joint commissioning and partnership approaches to planning. 
Given the complex needs of most people with drug issues, these 
collaboratives are likely to have an implication for the services people 
with drug problems receive. Drugs commissioners therefore need to 
understand and engage with these collaboratives as they are formed. 
• The government has announced a new National Institute for Health 
Protection as a response to the Covid-19 pandemic, which has 
implications for the rest of Public Health England, and potentially the 
public health system it oversees. There is an opportunity to rethink the 
public health system in England, including commissioning and 
accountability, and the role of national and regional tiers and the 
connection to ICSs. Those responding to Dame Carol Black’s 
Independent Review of Drugs will need to engage and influence public 
health reform, alongside the development of ICSs. 
What is an integrated care system? 
Integrated care systems (ICSs) are partnerships that bring together providers 
and commissioners of the NHS, local authorities and other local partners in a 
geographical area, to collectively plan and integrate care to meet the needs of 
their population (Charles 2020). They have been developing at different rates in 
different parts of England, and are expected to cover all of England by April 
2021, when there should be around 44 ICSs. 
ICSs are the latest in a long line of initiatives aiming to integrate care across 
local areas. They have grown out of sustainability and transformation 
partnerships – local partnerships formed in 2016 to develop long-term plans for 
the future of health and care services in their area. Compared with sustainability 
and transformation partnerships, ICSs are a closer form of collaboration in which 
NHS organisations and local authorities take on greater responsibility for 
collectively managing resources and performance and for changing the way care 
is delivered.  
Significant change is planned for 2021 and 2022 and is outlined in plans 
published at the end of November 2020 (NHS England and NHS Improvement 
2020). This includes stronger, but locally flexible, governance and accountability 
– bringing in wider partners including local government and the voluntary sector. 
It also includes proposals to formalise ICSs in legislation by April 2022. 
The proposals suggest that ICSs will have four aims in future:  
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• improving population health and health care 
• tackling unequal outcomes and access 
• enhancing productivity and value for money 
• helping the NHS to support broader social and economic development.  
So the purpose of ICSs is subtly beginning to develop beyond the provision of 
care itself (NHS England and Improvement 2020).  
What are the different planning levels within integrated 
care systems? 
A key feature of ICSs is the existence of different tiers or levels that focus on 
different aspects of the ICSs’ objectives. This means there are ‘systems within 
systems’ – as most ICSs cover large footprints, some of the most important 
work across health and local government happens below ICS level. NHS England 
and NHS Improvement have adopted terminology to describe these different 
levels. 
• System: the level of the ICS, typically covering a population of between 
one and three million people. Key functions include: setting and leading 
overall strategy; managing collective resources and performance; 
identifying and sharing best practice to reduce unwarranted variations in 
care; and leading changes that benefit from working at a larger scale, 
such as digital, estates and workforce transformation. 
 
• Place: a town or district within an ICS, often (but not always) 
coterminous with a council or borough, typically covering a population of 
250,000–500,000 people. This is where the majority of changes to clinical 
services will be designed and delivered, and where population health 
management will be used to target interventions to particular groups.  
• Neighbourhood: a small area, typically covering a population of 30,000–
50,000 people, where groups of GPs and community-based services work 
together to deliver co-ordinated, proactive care and support, particularly 
for groups and individuals with the most complex needs. Primary care 
networks and multidisciplinary community teams form at this level. 
ICSs vary in size, as do the tiers underneath them. For example, Dorset ICS 
covers a population of around 800,000 people, and is therefore equivalent in size 
to Leeds, which is a ‘place’ within the much bigger West Yorkshire and Harrogate 
ICS.  
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What are the implications of these developments for 
drug services? 
Given the focus of ICSs on integrating care across complex system boundaries, 
for patients with complex needs, it is important that drug treatment services 
align with commissioning and accountability in ICSs and vice versa. 
Place-level collaboration 
As outlined above, most ICSs have identified ‘places’ and smaller 
‘neighbourhoods’ that sit within them as units for planning and providing 
services, and in many parts of the country, strong and effective ‘place’-based 
partnerships exist across the NHS, local government and other partners (Charles 
et al forthcoming; Robertson and Ewbank 2020). ‘Place’ is also often the area 
over which the health and wellbeing board works, and therefore the area on 
which the local joint strategic needs assessment (JSNA) and local health and 
wellbeing strategy is focused – further facilitating efforts to collaborate to 
address local population needs. Some areas already have joint delegated 
budgets at ‘place’ level across the NHS and in aspects of local government 
spend, and plans are for this to increasingly become the case (NHS England and 
NHS Improvement 2020).  
As discussed earlier in this report, collaboration and joint commissioning can be 
facilitated by local partners agreeing a joint vision and being held to account for 
that vision. Given the strong partnerships and cross-sector structures that are 
developing at ‘place’ level, this may be the level at which collaboration between 
drug treatment service commissioners and the NHS should be perused and 
monitored. Connecting with this structure could facilitate better joint working 
with the NHS, which has been highlighted as a particular issue for drug 
treatment service commissioners. 
A bottom-up approach – and the connection with local government 
The development of ICSs has been locally led and iterative – compared with the 
way that the NHS usually leads change. This was necessary in order to make the 
most of local assets, skills and existing relationships. It was also necessary 
because different parts of the country started at very different stages in the 
development of integrated ways of working, meaning the right model in one part 
of England would not have been effective in another. NHS England and NHS 
Improvement outlined broad parameters about the structures local systems 
needed to establish, but the detail on how these would work and the speed with 
which they developed have been largely left to local areas (NHS England and 
Improvement 2019).  
Although the most recent proposals from NHS England and NHS Improvement 
(NHS England and Improvement 2020) seek to put ICSs on a more consistent 
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footing, there will continue to be significant differences in the scale and 
characteristics of ICSs and the local places within them, in different parts of the 
country.  
Any changes to the way drug treatment services are commissioned across the 
local authority/NHS divide will need to account for and engage with the varied, 
locally driven structures that exist to support integrated planning. This means 
that the most effective approach to improving links between drug treatment 
services and NHS services such as mental health services is likely to be different 
in different parts of the country – depending on the nature of their integrated 
planning structures, their maturity and the geographical footprints that they 
cover. This makes developing a single approach tricky and highlights the need to 
allow flexibility within any framework for local areas to adapt their approach to 
local circumstances.  
The experience of developing ICSs also shows that mandated structures for 
integrated planning and system development are unlikely to provoke change on 
their own. Bottom-up approaches that build on local strengths and include 
significant investment in developing relationships are likely to be the most 
successful, particularly when funding is tight. 
Finally, the NHS’s ‘discovery’ of place and bottom-up approaches for the future 
design and delivery of care also raises questions about the future relationship 
with local government. The fact that the key strategic footprint for the NHS is 
going to be more closely aligned with local government boundaries is a very 
positive principle. However, how this will work in practice is yet to be defined. 
The previous reforms introduced health and wellbeing boards (committees of 
local government), which were supposed to take on the role of assessing needs 
and designing a joint strategy with the NHS that would deliver policy and care to 
improve health. In practice, with exceptions, these have been under-powered 
(Hunter et al 2018), and the NHS has not seen them in this light. Instead, the 
NHS’s national leaders developed ICSs and other structures (such as primary 
care networks) and expect local government colleagues to support them. The 
leading ICSs (eg West Yorkshire and Harrogate) have had strong partnerships 
with local government (and the voluntary and community sector) from the start, 
but this is new territory for many of the ICSs. In conclusion, the NHS is making 
substantive efforts to be more place-based but this comes from a command-
and-control culture, very different from the more democratic structure of local 
government. How this will work, for planning, services and partnership, remains 
to be seen. 
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Commissioning and accountability across systems 
The Health and Social Care Act 2012 abolished strategic health authorities and 
removed the regional tier of accountability in the health system. This left a gap 
that the new structures have been emerging to fill over the past five years. 
Sustainability and transformation partnerships, and the ICSs that they are 
developing into, have taken on some of the responsibilities previously held by 
strategic health authorities for co-ordinating planning across a number of 
commissioning areas (multiple CCGs and local authorities). 
Some specialised commissioning responsibilities in the NHS are increasingly 
being devolved to ICSs. In many cases, specialised services need to be 
commissioned across more than one ICS in order to capture a large enough 
population to support the development of these low-volume services. The same 
principle of looking across multiple commissioners in order to get the scale 
needed to effectively commission specialised services should also be applied to 
specialised drug treatment services.  
Evidence in this report points to the importance of effective regional-level 
accountability structures. The emerging partnership structures being created 
through ICSs might be an effective place to consider situating any new 
accountability mechanisms being developed. These include any regional 
structure that might be developed to replace Public Health England, and the 
seven regional offices of NHS England and NHS Improvement, which have a role 
in health system oversight. However, there is a big question about scale and the 
appropriate footprint of a regional accountability role for drugs (as well as the 
formal powers) and whether that matches ICSs, or other footprints. This is an 
open question, but ICSs are subregional structures in the NHS that are being 
formed and this is a factor to be taken into account in any regional new 
structure that supports commissioning and accountability around drug services. 
Provider collaboratives 
All NHS providers will join provider collaboratives. These can be horizontal 
(between providers of the same type on an ICS or multi-ICS footprint – eg acute 
hospitals, specialist mental health trusts and ambulance trusts) or vertical 
(combining different types of providers at place level – eg community health, 
mental health and acute providers). Providers may find themselves part of both 
horizontal collaboratives at ICS level, and vertical collaboratives at place level. 
Horizontal provider collaboratives will be expected to reduce unwarranted 
variation, reduce inequalities of access, improve workforce planning and make 
efficiencies in clinical support and corporate services. They will be expected to 
agree and implement clinical pathways and reconfiguration, and challenge and 
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hold each other to account with open-book approaches to finance. These 
horizontal provider collaboratives are mostly at an early stage of development 
and NHS England will provide further guidance in the NHS Operational Planning 
Guidance for 2021/2 alongside further preparatory support. 
Well-designed provider collaboratives are the mirror of joint commissioning and 
partnership approaches to planning. Given the complex needs of most people 
with drug issues, these collaboratives are likely to have an implication for the 
services people with drug problems receive. Drugs commissioners therefore 
need to understand and engage with these collaboratives as they are formed. 
System leadership 
Repeated studies show that strong leadership is critical to developing effective 
services across sectors. Getting the right type of local leadership has been a key 
facilitator of NHS integration. However, this requires investment to support and 
develop leaders. It also means leaders need to have the time available to 
develop and build relationships. This is particularly important for drug services 
where the complex issues faced by service users means connections need to be 
made with a wide range of services and sectors. 
A key challenge for drug services will be ensuring they are visible to system 
leaders. From the conversations we have had with commissioners, areas that 
seem to be succeeding in collaborating have a very engaged director of public 
health and elected member of the health and wellbeing board. 
From competition to collaboration  
The NHS is moving away from using competition as a tool for improvement and 
is firmly focused on collaboration as the best route to fulfilling the health and 
care needs of local populations. The latest proposals for legislative change 
reinforce previous suggestions to reduce the power of the market by, for 
example, reducing the role of the Competition and Markets Authority in the NHS 
and removing some of the rules and requirements relating to competitive 
procurement (NHS England and NHS Improvement 2020).  
Commissioners and providers across the NHS and local government are 
increasingly working together to plan services collaboratively through ICSs and 
the local places within them, and the latest proposals from NHS England and 
NHS Improvement include strengthening the role of providers (working in 
networks) in commissioning and service development.  
The problems caused by competitive procurement processes in the NHS and 
local government have been well documented (eg NHS England 2016; Robertson 
et al 2017) (although it is also important to remember that they have in some 
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cases driven innovation and transformation efforts). There is fairly universal 
agreement that the use of competitive tendering is sometimes inappropriate and 
detrimental to local services provision. The prevailing view is that commissioners 
should be given more discretion to enable them to use competitive procurement 
as a tool for improvement only where it is appropriate.  
Working with patients, the public and communities  
Some of the best examples of innovation around patients happen in systems 
that are taking a collaborative approach to commissioning (Robertson and 
Ewbank 2020). Collaboration – between commissioners and providers, and also 
with communities – taps into intrinsic motivations and enables strategies and 
services to be developed that focus on the needs of local populations and not on 
individual organisations (Davidson-Knight et al 2017).  
Effective systems are based on a new relationship with the communities they 
serve. Any new approach to commissioning drug treatment services needs to 
have communities and service users at its heart.  
There are examples across the NHS and local government of local systems 
working successfully with their local community to develop services that meet 
patients’ needs. Some of the most impressive examples take an asset-based 
approach that builds on the strengths of individuals and communities to improve 
outcomes (Naylor and Wellings 2019).  
Working with patients and communities is an area that the NHS has sometimes 
fallen short on in the past. Sustainability and transformation partnerships were 
initially criticised for a lack of patient and public involvement in their plans 
(Doughty 2016). However, it is an area that drug treatment services will need to 
get right if they want to develop services that meet service users’ needs and the 
needs of the local community.  
The new public health system  
The government has announced a new National Institute for Health Protection as 
a response to the Covid-19 pandemic, which has implications for the rest of 
Public Health England, and potentially the public health system it oversees – on 
current timelines, decisions are due to be made by spring 2021 (Department of 
Health and Social Care 2020). Notwithstanding the wisdom of doing this now, 
there is an opportunity to rethink the public health system in England, including 
commissioning and accountability, and the role of national and regional tiers 
(Elwell-Sutton et al 2020; Sloggett 2020). This may include a stronger 
connection to the development of ICSs, in particular to ensure they are 
connecting strongly to other local partners in place and responding to 
community needs and assets. Those responding to Dame Carol Black’s 
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Independent Review of Drugs will need to engage and influence public health 
reform, alongside the development of ICSs.  
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